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Right to Counsel on Arrest: A Federal
Exclusionary Rule Against Confessions and
Admissions Illegally Obtained in State
Prosecutions
Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good
or ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is con-
tagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it"breeds
contempt for law; it mvites anarchy.'
_ Justice Louts D. Brandeis'
I INTRODUCTION
THE PURPOSE of this Note is to review the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court, the decisions of Ohio courts,
the Ohio statutes, and the rationale of the law affecting the right
of an accused to see and consult his attorney immediately on arrest
by the police.
The above statement from Justice Brandeis' opinion in the
Olmstead case' *reflects a policy principle- that officers -of the
government must themselves obey the law when enforcing the
criniial law." After several decades of rejection by the Court's
ruling majorities, the homely maxim of "practice what you preach"
has received effective judicial application in criminal law enforce-
ment by police as well as in other important constitutional areas.4
Undoubtedly, -foreign affairs and the international struggle of
democracy against totalitarianism during the last thirty -years has
1. Olmstead v. United.States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (dissenting opinion). It.is beyond
the scope of this article to consider all of the complex ramifications of the Supreme
Court's acnviiy in reviewing state criminal proceedings. 'The cases and literature are
vast. See, e.g., Broeder, Wong Sun v. United States: A Study in Faith and Hope, 42
NB. L. REv. 483 (1963).
2. The Supreme Court in this case allowed a criminal conviction to stand on evidence
obtained by wire tapping. Holmes referred to it as "dirty business." 277 U.S. 438,
470 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
3. Barrett, Police Practwes and the Law - From Arrest to Release or Chajgb, 50
CALIF. L REV. 11, 13 (1962).
4. E.g., school segregation. Commenting on the source of impetus for the Court's
1954 reversal of the separate but equal principle in school segregation, Yale Professor
Rodell states that the "Court's big decisions, and a disproportionately large part.of all
its decisions [1949 to 1954], dealt with, stemmed from, or were mainly motvated by
the cold war with Communist Russia , nor is there any doubt that the pro-
Negro pronouncements - as many Southerners have accurately, if angrily, charged
were pushed to such unprecedented lengths to help counter Communist propaganda in
Asia and frica about American maltreatment of people whose skins are not white.
RODELL, NINE MEN 303 (1955).
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repeatedly compelled the Supreme Court to examine American
police practices in relation to the freedoms demanded by the United
States in behalf of oppressed foreign minorities and peoples.5 The
"reports of trials in Hitler's Germany, in the Russia of Lenin, Stalin,
and Khrushchev, and most recently in Castro's Cuba, have been
filled with confessions of alleged criminal defendants only too
happy to serve both as prosecuting witnesses and defendants ....'
Moreover, "totalitarian states, no matter the name they bear, always
utilize coerced testimony wherever necessary to arrive at their de-
sired verdicts because to them the ends justify the means."7  The
United States courts' have many times set their face against this per-
nicious rule.
The problem of police discipline came to the attention of the
Supreme Court in 1936 when police forces all over the United States
had irritated and antagonized the public by their "Gestapo" methods
of third degree brutality.9 During this period, the case of Powell v.
Alabama"° shocked a conservative Court when it was demon-
strated that virtually all of the accuseds' fundamental rights as
national citizens were denied by the state. These law enforcement
procedures lacking even the minimal standards of due process brought
on Supreme Court supervision of state criminal procedures." How-
ever, the Supreme Court did not assume complete authority over all
questions of criminal procedure. Instead, for at least twenty-five
years, the Supreme Court had knowingly permitted the states to
convict and punish numerous defendants by means of illegally
obtained evidence: confessions,"2 admissions, and the "fruits" of
illegal searches."
The 1964 case of Escobedo v. Illinois' put a rather sudden end
to this noble federal experiment of encouraging the states to volun-
tarily provide constitutional liberties to their citizens. Unfortunate-
5. Fink, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination - A Critical Reappraisal, 13 W.
REs. L. REv. 722 (1962).
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. E.g., compare Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866); United States Tel.
Co. v. Central Union Tel. Co., 202 Fed. 66, 75 (6th Cir. 1913).
9. E.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1963); see White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530
(1940).
10. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
11. Mueller, The Law Relating to Police Interrogation Privileges and Limitations, 52
J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 2, 5 (1961).
12. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
13. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
14. 378 U.S. 468 (1964).
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ly, the states had continued in their constitutional default, resulting
in the coercive use of federal supremacy.' 5 The "tool" by which
the Supreme Court has worked this startling reversal is the exclu-
sionary rule of evidence. It prohibits the prosecution from introduc-
ing as evidence at the trial of the accused, a confession or admission
of guilt obtained after the accused's arrest and refusal of the police
to allow him to see counsel."8 Although this rule is based on the
sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel'" and the fourth
amendment prohibition against unreasonable seizure of persons,'"
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination 9 clearly
is the basic liberty which the Court seeks to protect.2" Moreover, in
each case under the exclusionary rule the Supreme Court has found
that the police 'violated a state statute prohibiting prisoner deten-
tion." In the recent Ohio case of State v. Domer,22 the court was
required to reverse a murder conviction on a denial of assistance of
counsel on arrest as required by Ohio statutes under the compulsion
of United States Supreme Court decisions.2" Hence, while the state
courts had ignored the state statutes which require the police to al-
low an accused on arrest to call and consult with his attorney, the
new decisions breathe renewed life into these statutes."4 Before con-
sidering the Ohio cases and statutes, a review of the developments
in the United States Supreme Court is essential to an evaluation of
the policy conflicts as well as present and future law in this field.
15. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST., art. 6.
16. See text accompanying notes 118-22 infra.
17. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy ahd
public trial ... and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST.
amend. VI; see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
18. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons... against unreasonable...
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause...
describing.., the persons ... to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend IV; see Wong Sun
v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
19. "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime...;
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. .. ." U.S.
CONST. amend. V; see Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
20. SILVING, ESSAYS ON CRIMINAL PROCurRE 269 (1964); see generally Fink,
supra note 5.
21. See text accompanying notes 109, 114, 177 infra.
22. 1 Ohio App. 2d 155, 204 N.E.2d 69 (1964).
23. See text accompanying note 175 infra;, note 163 infra lists the nine major grounds
for reversal.
24. See text accompanying notes 186, 187, 192 infra.
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II. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES
Within the last few years the Supreme Court has in numerous
cases" "absorbed" substantial sections of the Bill of Rights into the
fourteenth amendment due process clause, and has made these con-
stitutional guarantees of liberty against the federal government
equally effective against the states,26 if not more so.27
At the outset, it should be noted that there is little case law
under federal prosecutions which the Supreme Court has applied to
the states in the area of unlawful detention because of denial of as-
sistance of counsel. Since 1936, the federal indigent defendant has
had the right to counsel;2" and since 1943, the Supreme Court un-
der its federal supervisory power has excluded confessions obtained
during an unlawful detention29 in violation of rule 5 (a) 3" of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which requires that an accused
be taken forthwith before a Commissioner. Consequently, the Su-
preme Court has developed independent lines of constitutional cases
applicable to state violations of a defendant's right to consult with
his lawyer prior to trial.3
Three relatively separate lines of cases impinge on the present
25. See note 26 infra.
26. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (sixth amendment right to assis-
tance of counsel in trials of "serious crimes"); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
(fourth amendment right of privacy against unlawful and unreasonable searches and
seizures); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination), Recent Decision, 15 W. REs. L. REV. 797 (1964); Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (sixth amendment right to counsel embraces the ex-
clusionary rule against confessions obtained during unlawful detention).
27. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), where the Court required the
state to supply counsel to indigent prisoners for their appeal from conviction to the
California District Court of Appeals. This specific right to assistance of counsel under
the sixth amendment goes further than the present rule in the federal courts. Possibly
this position in criminal law is a reflection of the Court's reasoning in the Reappor-
tionment Cases: the states are not coordinate with the federal government or any branch
thereof; consequently the Court can direct the states under the authority of the four-
teenth amendment due process clause, while the Court cannot compel such equivalent
acts of a coordinate branch of the federal government, i.e., the Congress or the Presi-
dent. See RODELL, NINE MEN 307 (1955).
28. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
29. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318
U.S. 332 (1943).
30. "Appearance before the Commissioner. An officer making an arrest under a
warrant issued upon a complaint or any person making an arrest without a warrant
shall take the arrested person without unnecessary delay before the nearest available
commissioner or before any other nearby officer empowered to commit persons charged
with offenses against the laws of the United States. When a person arrested without a
warrant is brought before a commissioner or other officer, a complaint shall be filed
forthwith." (Emphasis added.)
31. See Broeder, supra note 1 passim.
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state of the law as promulgated by the Supreme Court: (1) invol-
untary confessions in violation of the fourteenth amendment due
process clause;' (2) unlawful seizure or detention of an accused in
violation of the fourth amendment; and (3) the denial of assistance
of counsel in violation of the sixth amendment.3 2
The bulk of the involuntary confession cases were the first to
be decided by the Court and they will be considered here initially;
however, their importance is being shaded by the other two classes
of cases. It should be remembered, however, that an element of
each constitutional ground was present in virtually all cases33
A. Confession Cases
(1) Lisenba v. California. 4 -The first relevant case in the
Supreme Court, aside from the obvious unlawful confession by tor-
ture in Brown v. Mississippi, was Lisenba v. 'California. Defend-
ant and another man conspired and carried out a plan to kill de-
fendant's pregnant wife, to whom defendant had been married for
only a short period of time. Defendant had large amounts of insur-
ance on his wife. Hope, an accomplice, brought two snakes to de-
fendant's home and these were used to bite the wife as she was tied to
a chair. Defendant was arrested on a Sunday and questioned con-
tinuously through Tuesday mornng;, he was finally arraigned on a
charge of incest. He admitted nothing of the mt.rder. About eleven
days later at the jail defendant was confronted with Hope, who had
confessed and turned state's evidence. Defendant said nothing. Laterhe was taken out of jail to the district attorney's office where he was
questioned by relays of officers, including one wh6 had slaiped de-
fendant on. a prior questioning. On this occasion defendant asked
for his attorney and was told he was out of town and that he couldn't
call any other attorney. He was not given any iood from 1 P. M. to
midnight when he said he Would tell his story if he could eat: There-
after he did eat at a cafe and confessed. Later he again confessed
to the district attorney.
32. While substantially all of the Bill of Rights has been made applicable to the states
via the fourteenth amendment'du6 process clause, it is not yet clear whether all federal
prosecutions decided on a constitutional authority constitute ruling case law in state
prosecutions. But cf. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Recent Decision, 15 W.
REs. L REV. 797, 799 (1964).
33. E.g., Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954) (arrested without enough evidence
to constitute probable cause; denied counsel; confessions extracted by psychological co-
ercion); see also text accompanying note 44 infra.
34. 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
35. 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (defendant beaten until he confessed).
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The issues were: (1) the admissibility of the confession; (2) de-
nial of right to counsel; and (3) lawlessness of the police officers.
The Court held as a matter of law that the trial court and jury did
not err in convicting the defendant even though admittedly defend-
ant had been slapped by one officer. Conduct of the police in failing
to promptly arraign and allow counsel to see defendant and illegally
removing the defendant from the jail were disapproved, but no sanc-
tion was applied by the Court. Defendant's conviction was affirmed.
The Court ruled, however, that it would make independent examina-
tions of the record to determine if there was a denial of due process
in state proceedings.3" "Fundamental fairness" was to be the test of
justice in criminal trials.
The Supreme Court in Lisenba followed a traditional approach
of warning the state by pointing out the due process errors in its
criminal procedures. Even though the Court refused to reverse
Lisenba's conviction, a unique rule of far-reaching importance was
announced: the Supreme Court would make an independent exami-
nation of the record in the due-process-confession-cases coming up
from state courts.37 Thus, the Court was no longer bound by find-
ings of fact by the jury, or rulings based on local law made by
state court judges.
(2) Ashcraft v. Tennessee. 3s -This case stands as a landmark
decision (1) in favor of individual liberty against state-coerced con-
fessions by means of prolonged, police-team interrogation, and (2)
in support of the rule that a confession must be corroborated by in-
dependent evidence of guilt.3"
Ashcraft was convicted of hiring a young Negro, Ware, to mur-
der his wife. Both were tried and sentenced to ninety-nine years in
prison. Aside from the alleged confessions of Ware and Ashcraft,
there was no other evidence to sustain the conviction.
Ashcraft was taken into custody on a Saturday evening and taken
to an interrogation room of the Memphis police station where strong
lights were used to blind him. He was questioned continuously by
teams of police officers and prosecutors for thirty-six hours without
sleep, regular meals, or use of the toilet. After about twenty-eight
hours of questioning, Ashcraft first implicated Ware, who was then
arrested and taken to the police station. He allegedly confessed and
36. 314 U.S. 219, 237 (1941).
37. Ibid.
38. 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
39. See Note, Proof of the Corpus Delicti Aliunde the Defendant's Confession, 103
U. PA. L. REv. 638 (1955).
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indicated that he had been hired by Ashcraft to murder the wife.
His "confession" was prepared by the police, and he supposedly
signed it with an "X." When Ashcraft was confronted with this
confession, he allegedly confessed; however, he refused to sign the
confession paper until he had seen his lawyer. The state, however,
had witnesses to this confession procedure who testified it was volun-
tary. Within a short time after this event Ashcraft was arraigned
before a magistrate and he plead not guilty.
At the trial Ashcraft denied having made any admission or con-
fession and denied any guilt of the crime. Ware repudiated his con-
fession at trial on the ground that he was threatened and coerced by
the police and that he knew nothing of the crime. The confessions
were submitted to the jury which apparently believed they were vol-
untary and true.
The Court held that disputes as to the details of what transpired
within the confession chamber of the jail cannot be resolved. "They
are the inescapable consequences of secret inquisitorial practices."
More importantly, however, the confession was held to be com-
pelled, that during the ten days of investigation preceding arrest the
police had been unable to unearth a single piece of evidence to point
to Ashcraft, and that his detention and interrogation were based
solely on suspicion. Such a situation was held inherently coercive.
Justice Black for the Court stated:
The Constitution of the United States stands as a bar against the
conviction of any individual in an American Court by means of
coerced confession. There have been, and are now [1944] cer-
tain foreign nations with governments dedicated to an opposite
policy: governments which convict individuals with testimony
obtained by police organizations possessed of an unrestrained power
to seize persons suspected of crimes against the state, hold them in
secret custody, and wring from them confessions by physical or
mental torture. So long as the Constitution remains the basic law
of our Republic, America will not have that kind of govern-
ment.40
Justice Jackson, dissenting, would have allowed the state of Ten-
nessee to have the last word on its criminal law. He accurately
pointed to the underlying problem: the immunity given the accused
by the privilege against self-incrimination. And, he justified the
use of illegal police tactics as an extrajudicial counter weight to the
privilege.4' However, he insisted that the states provide a "fair
trial" and that torture, physical or mental, not be allowed to extract
40. 322 U.S. 143, 155 (1944).
41. Id. at 159 (dissenting opinion).
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confessions. "Fundamental fairness" then is another expression em-
bracing each judge's individual concept of due process and is of
limited utility as a judicial precedent.
(3) Haley v. Ohio. 4 -In the Ohio Court of Appeals, Haley43
was treated as an ordinary case where the defendant confessed rela-
tively early in his detention, and while the police committed several
acts contrary to Ohio law in their handling of the defendant, he
was clearly guilty, as proven by independent corroborative evidence:
the police found the murder gun buried at the place where the de-
fendant said it was. Hence, there was no compelling reason to ex-
clude the confession or reverse the conviction. Nevertheless, the Su-
preme Court reversed the conviction, and took an entirely different
set of facts on which to base its decision.
Haley, a fifteen-year-old-boy, was one of three juveniles who had
allegedly killed a store keeper during a robbery. He was arrested
five days later at about midnight and questioned until about 5:30
A. M. when he signed a typewritten confession. There was the in-
evitable conflict about third degree methods during the interroga-
tion. He was not told of his constitutional rights until just before
he signed the confession. Thereafter, he was held incommunicado
for five days. On two occasions a lawyer retained by his mother at-
tempted to see him but was turned away, although the police had
allowed a news photographer to take the accused's picture shortly
after he confessed. He was not taken before a magistrate until three
days after he confessed.
The Supreme Court held that the methods used to obtain the
confession violated due process. Haley is one of those cases where
no single view commands a majority of the Court. Thus the case
stands as an example of a procedural due process violation. .
(4) Leyra v. Denno.44-Defendant was tried and convicted of
the murder of his parents with a hammer and sentenced to death.
He was questioned intensively by police for many days. While de-
fendant was in a state of near-exhaustion and pain from his sinus
condition, the police sent a doctor to treat him. The doctor, how-
ever, was a state-employed psychiatrist who did nothing to help his
pain; instead by careful questioning, promises, and threats, he ob-
tained a confession from the accused. Immediately thereafter he was
42. 332 U.S. 596 (1948). Defendant subsequently reconvicted. Ritz, infra note 57.
43. Sub. nom., State v. Lowder, 79 Ohio App. 237, 72 N.E.2d 785 (1946), appeal
dis-missed, 147 Ohio St. 530, 72 N.E.2d 102 (1947).
44. 347 U.S. 556 (1954).
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made to repeat his confession to the police and a business associate.
At his first trial, the oral confession to the state psychiatrist was used,
but the New York Court of Appeals reversed. At the second trial,
only the subsequent otal confessions were' used. In a subsequent
habeas corpus proceeding in the federal courts, the Supreme Court
held that such methods of extracting a confession from the accused,
alone and without assistance of counsel, violate due process.
One authority in the field now believes that Leyra and similar
cases of police deception have outlawed trickery as a police tactic
to obtain confessions and admissions." On the other hand, Inbau
insists that the Supreme Court and the state courts permit any
sort of police interrogation'tactic short of "third degree" - physical
brutality."8 The law enforcement agencies continue in the view
that the judicial test of admissibility of a confession should be its
truthfulness and reliability and not the conduct of the police in
procuring it,47 despite the fact that the Supreme Court dearly and
specifically repudiated that test in Rogers v. Richmond.48
(5) Culombe ;v. Connecticut.4 -- This case may be the last
of the significant "involuntary" confession cases to be decided by
the Supreme Court. Justice Frankfurter wrote a long treatise on
the subject which resolved nothing and irritated the Chief Justice.'
Defendant Culombe was a thirty-three-year-old illiterate mental de-
fective of the moron class who was held in' continuous custody and
questioned intermittently for four days. The police also made
use of his wife and children to secure a confession. He was denied
counsel when he requested assistance, and the police failed to
promptly arraign him as required by Connecticut statutes. He was
taken before a police court on a sham charge of breach-of-the-peace
in order to avoid a lawful appearance before a court which would
have informed him of his right to counsel and appointed counsel.
45. Weisberg, Police Interrogation of Arrested Persons: A Skeptical View, 52 J. CRim.
L, C. & P.s. 21, 32 (1961). In Spano v. New York and Escobedo v. Illinois, the
police used a friend or acquaintance of the accused as an interrogator to help get a con-
fession. The police use many ruses. See Inbau's suggestions, text accompanying note
234 infra.
46. Inbau, Police Interrogation - A Practical Necessity, 52 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S.
16, 17 (1961); see generally Comment, Effective Law Enforcement and Constitutional
Liberty: An Analysis of the New York Law on Confessions, 32 FORDEAM L. REV. 339
(1963).
47. Inbau, supra note 46; passim.
48. 365 U.S. 534 (1961). Rogers is more fully discussed in text accompanying note
102 infra.
49. 367 U.S. 568 (1961).
50. Id. at 635.
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The Court held the confession involuntary and inadmissible as
evidence.5
Some commentators believe that the subsequent case of Gallegos
v. Colorado52 announced a new principle of constitutional law in
this field;53 however, it appears to be the same "fair trial" rule of
Betts v. Brady,4 discarded in 1963.-5
Professor Ritz"s has made an interesting and valuable study
of the subsequent history of twenty-one confession cases reversed
by the Supreme Court.57 While the ultimate result of these specific
cases may be unsatisfactory, the effect on the administration of
criminal justice at the local level has been dramatic. So much of
a change has occurred that the prosecutor is now advised not to
use a confession in any case where he has enough other evidence
to convict.58 Others urge law enforcement agencies to abandon
the practice of seeking confessions, and to recognize that the medieval
times which created their need have passed. Instead it is suggested
that police seek only scientific facts as proof of guilt59 over which
there can be no equivocation as with the alleged compulsions of the
secret interrogation chamber buried in the police precincts. The
policy arguments pro and con confessions are more fully discussed
infra.6" At this point Supreme Court cases on unlawful arrest and
delay in arraignment 6' are reviewed because without continuous ref-
51. Id. at 568; Case Comment, 42 B.U.L. REv. 129 (1962).
52. 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
53. Professor King indicates that Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962), an-
nounced a new constitutional standard for determining voluntariness of confessions -
that is, an examination of the totality of circumstances, incommunicado detention, fail-
ure to inform the accused of his constitutional rights, psychological pressure on the
accused to confess, and the age and ability of the accused to withstand such pressure.
King, Developing A Future Constitutional Standard for Confessions, 8 WAYNE L. REV.
481, 485-87 (1962); see also Recent Cases, 31 U. CINC. L. REV. 454 (1962).
54. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
55. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
56. Washington & Lee Law School.
57. Summary: 3 cases - same punishment, same conviction; 4 cases - lesser punish-
ment, same conviction; 4 cases - lesser punishment, lesser conviction; 1 case - de-
fendant killed by husband of rape victim; 4 cases - state nole prosequi; 1 case -
defendant placed in mental institution; 2 cases - acquittals; 2 cases - reconvictions
reversed & nolled. Ritz, State Criminal Confession Cases: Subsequent Developments in
Cases Reversed by U.S. Supreme Court and Some Current Problems, 19 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 202, 208-10 (1962).
58. Id. at 224.
59. Meuller, supra note 11, at 14-15.
60. See text accompanying notes 199-297 infra.
61. The term "arraignment" is here used to mean the first appearance of the accused
before a magistrate. In Ohio, the first appearance precedes the "preliminary hearing"
and "arraignment," which in Ohio means the formal pleading stage. See note 196 infra.
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erence to the salient facts of these leading cases, a coherent analysis
of the subject may be rendered nugatory.
B. Unconstitutional Arrests and Detention
The Supreme Court in the area of federal prosecutions long ago
outlawed confessions obtained during a period of detention after
arrest for interrogation and confession-procurement based not on
the Constitution, but on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure."
(1) McNabb v. United States. -Defendants were arrested for
the murder of a federal officer who came to investigate a "still"
on their property in Tennessee. Ignorant and without knowledge
of their rights, they were interrogated for several days until .admis-
sions of guilt were made. Convicted, they were sentenced to
forty-five years in prison. The Supremie Court reversed because
they had not been taken before a commissioner forthwith as re-
quired by the Rules.
(2) Mallory v. United States. ---Within the fifteen years
after McNabb there were numerous cases which watered down the
rule and distinguished it away. However, in Mallory, the Court
reaffirmed McNabb. 5
Defendant Mallory, nineteen years of age and of limited mental
capacity, was taken into custody at 2:30 P. M. on suspicion of raping
a woman in the basement of an apartment. At 10 P. M., after in-
terrogation and lie detector tests, he confessed. He was not arraigned
until the next morning. The conviction was reversed because of
a failure to promptly arraign the defendant, and because the delay
was to obtain a confession. Obviously, the Court believed that the
delay was to obtain enough evidence via interrogation to hold
the defendant over for trial, viz., on arrest the officers did not have
probable cause. Thus, the interrogation gap between arrest and
arraignment was to obtain evidence from the defendant to hold
over and convict. This the Court refused to allow.66
62. See note 30 supra, and accompanying text; see generally Rothblart & Rothblatt,
Police Interrogation. The Right to Counsel and to Prompt Arraignment, 27 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 24, 34 (1960).
63. 318 U.S. 332 (1942), Note, 2 OKLA. L. REv. 337 (1949).
64. 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
65. Ibid; see Hogan & Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule - Its Rise, Rationale and
Rescue, 47 GEo. LJ. 1 (1958).
66. 354 U.S. 449 (1957). The Mallory case has been much criticized because of the
subsequent criminal acts of the defendant. See Inbau, supra note 46, at 20 n.6.
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The McNabb-Mallory rule is applicable only to federal prosecu-
tions. However, if Mallory was applied to the states, all arrests
on suspicion would be outlawed, for the Court specifically held that
the accused must be taken as quickly as possible before a magistrate
for a determination of probable cause. "The police may not arrest
upon mere suspicion but only upon 'probable cause.'-"7
The McNabb-Mallory rule of prompt appearance is important
to state law enforcement because many states, as Ohio,6" have
statutes very similar to the federal rule.69
(3) Wong Sun v. United States.7-- In a federal narcotics case,
the agents arrested Horn Way and found heroin in his possession.
He had not been arrested before and was not a reliable informant.
Nevertheless, the agents broke into Blackie Toy's laundry on vague
information supplied by Horn Way. Arrested in his bedroom, Toy
admitted using heroin and implicated Johnny Yee. Yee was sub-
sequently arrested and found to possess heroin; he admitted buy-
ing from a person later identified as Wong Sun. The agents ar-
rested Wong Sun, but no narcotics were found. Blackie Toy and
Wong Sun later made admissions which were reduced to writing by
the agents; but each refused to sign them. All oral and written
admissions were introduced at trial. These two pedtioners were
convicted and appealed. Both convictions were reversed by the
Supreme Court.
The Court held that the arresting officers did not have probable
cause to arrest Blackie Toy, for Horn Way did not give them an
address and he was not a proven, reliable informer. "ITihe arrest-
ing officer need not have in hand evidence which would suffice to
convict. The quantum of information which constitutes probable
cause - evidence which would 'warrant a man of reasonable cau-
tion in the belief' that a felony had been committed. . . - must be
measured by the facts of the particular case."'" The admissions
made by Toy in his bedroom after the unlawful entry and arrest
were excluded as the "fruit" of an unlawful arrest.
67. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 454 (1957).
68. See note 194 infra.
69. The Rothblatts list eleven exceptions to McNabb, relating primarily to procedural
distinctions in handling the accused in the police station. Essentially, short periods of
detention for finger-printing, completing investigating details, etc. were permissible
and confessions made by the accused within this short period were allowed. Rothblatt
& Rothblatt, supra note 62, at 40-42.
70. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
71. Id. at 479.
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[V]erbal evidence which derives so immediately from an un-
lawful entry and an unauthorized arrest as the officers' actions in
the present case is ... the "fruit' of official illegality .... 72
[T] he Fourth Amendment may protect against the overhearing
of verbal statements as well as against the more traditional seizure
of "papers and effects." 73
Narcotics seized from Yee as a result of Toy's unlawfully obtained
admission were used in evidence against defendants. This use of
such "derivative" evidence was challenged and the Court held that
the test is "whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality,
the evidence... has been come at by exploitation of that illegality
or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the
primary taint."'  Here, the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine
applied. On the question then of whether criminal confessions and
admissions of guilt require extrinsic corroboration, the Court held:
"In our country the doubt persists that the zeal of the agencies of
prosecution to protect the peace, the self-interest of the accomplice,
the maliciousness of an enemy or the aberration or weakness of the
accused under the strain of suspicion may tinge or warp the facts of
the confession. Admissions, retold at a trial, are much like hearsay,
that is, statements not made at the pending trial.,
75
As Wong Sun made admissions to the agents several days after
his release on bail, the Court held that this confession could be used
against him because the connection between the arrest and the
statement had "become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint""
Wong Sun marks an important point in judicial interpretation
of the fourth amendment by prohibiting use of the "fruits of an
illegal arrest" - a confession or admission - in an accused's crimi-
nal trial. The case also severely limits the authority of the federal
police to arrest on suspicion. While Wong Sun was a federal prose-
cution, it has been argued7" that McNabb-Mallory was placed on a
constitutional ground by Wong Sun. Considering the developments
subsequent to Wong Sun,7s this may be so; and the states may have
to comply with the requirement of prompt arraignment of a suspect
before a magistrate or be forced to go forward with the prosecution
72. Id. at 485.
73. Ibid.
74. Id. at 488.
75. Id. at 489.
76. Id. at 491.
77. Broeder, Wong Sun v. United States: A Study in Faith and Hope, 42 NEB. L.
REv. 483, 484-85 (1963).
78. E.g., Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
1965]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
without the confession or admission made by the accused during the
delay interval. By a close reading of Wong Sun and Mapp v. Ohio, 9
however, it is argued that the fourth amendment prohibition against
unreasonable seizures of persons8" may terminate the discussion over
the applicability of McNabb-Mallory to the states.
(4) Beck v. Ohio.81-An informer told the Cleveland police
that defendant would be driving in a certain neighborhood with
policy slips. He was seen, stopped, searched and arrested. Noth-
ing was found. Defendant was taken to a police station and care-
fully searched; the policy slips were found in his sock. He was
convicted.
On the issue of probable cause, the record showed only that police
knew defendant and that he had a prior criminal record. When
the arrest and search were challenged, the police failed to support
their probable cause for arrest without a warrant. The Court held
that it was incumbent on the prosecution to show with considerable
specificity: (1) what the informer actually said; and (2) why the
officers thought the informer was credible. Neither subjective good
faith by the police, nor the finding of evidence can justify an illegal
search.
Thus, in a state prosecution, the Court adopted a standard of
probable cause previously thought to be applicable only to the
federal government. At this point in the Constitutional evolution
of civil liberties, it cannot be overstressed that for all practical pur-
poses the "rights" embraced by the first eight amendments of the
Constitution have been made effective against the states by "absorp-
tion" or a "process of inclusion" through the fourteenth amendment.
The next section of this Note will show not only that the specific
elements of the Bill of Rights have been applied to the states in
criminal prosecutions, but that the Court has embarked on a novel
doctrine framed in the semantics of the right to assistance of
counsel.82
C. Right to Counsel Cases
Powell v. Alabama83 in 1932 marks the modern beginning of
federal constitutional law regulating state criminal procedures un-
79. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
80. Broeder, supra note 77, at 570-71.
81. 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
82. See Enker & Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and Esco-
bedo v. Illinois, 49 MINN. L. REv. 47 (1964).
83. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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der the due process clause.84 Professor Allen 5 identifies the follow-
ing reasons for entrance of the Supreme Court into this area:
(1) nationwide scandals of lawless, careless and brutal police pro-
cedures, pointed up by the numerous surveys and studies of the
1920's; and (2) the rise of Hider to power and that crisis in
individual liberty in the criminal area."6 Significantly within the
present context of judicial supervision of state criminal procedures,
Powell was decided on the issue of denial of assistance of counsel.87
However, that case was severely limited to judicial proceedings
against indigent defendants accused of a capital crime under "spe-
cial circumstances." Nevertheless, the broad dictum phrased so elo-
quently by Justice Sutherland became a cornerstone in the right-to-
counsel edifice: "Even the intelligent and -educated layman has
small and sometimes no skill in the science of the law. If charged
with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself
whether the indictment is good or bad.... He requires the guiding
hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him."88
(1) Crooker v. California.Y--Prior to the 1963 cases,'.
Crooker would have dictated a result directly opposite to- the'current
reversals of convictions for denial of assistance of counsel at arrest.
In Crooker, the defendant was a law student and had studied crimi-
nal law. Upon his arrest for the murder of his paramour, the po-
lice obtained his voluntary confession; but only after he had made
numerous pleas to talk to his lawyer which were refused. The
Court held that the due process clause did not require the exclusion
of the confession because of the denial of the right to counsel. In
1958, the Court was still operating on the "fair trial rule," the "fun-
damental fairness test," and the "shocking to our sense of jpstice"
criterion. 1  .
_(2) Spano v. New York. 2-- In 1959, the Supreme Court
84. Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism, and State Systems of Criminal Justice, 8
DEPAUL L REV. 213, 215 (1959).
85. University of Chicago Law School.
86. Allen, supra note 84, at 218-19.
87. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 50 (1932).
88. Id. at 69.
89. 357 U.S. 433 (1958); see also the companion case of Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S.
504 (1958).
90. Haynes v. Washington, 372 U.S. 503 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963).
91. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25
(1949); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319
(1937).
92. 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
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reached a point of departure for an entirely new line of cases
which would eventually lead to an exclusionary rule under the sixth
amendment" affecting confessions the same as Mapp v. Ohio94 was
to exclude illegally seized evidence under the fourth amendment 5
in state prosecutions. Chief Justice Warren recognized the funda-
mental conflict between individual liberty and law enforcement:
the Court is "forced to resolve a conflict between two fundamental
interests of society; its interest in prompt and efficient law enforce-
ment, and its interest in preventing the rights of its individual mem-
bers from being abridged by unconstitutional methods of law
enforcement."9 The resolution of this divergence over policy objec-
tives has led the Court into bitter assaults by the law enforcement
agencies and its minions0'
Defendant Vincent Spano was indicted for a barroom homicide
and soon thereafter surrendered to the police. He was intensively
questioned by many different police officers and district attorneys
throughout the night. He insisted three times on speaking with his
retained attorney, but was refused each time. The defendant was a
personal friend of officer Bruno, apparently a rookie police officer.
At the insistence of his superiors, Bruno told defendant Spano that he
would lose his job unless Spano confessed, thus threatening the eco-
nomic security of Bruno's three children and wife. At 3:25 A. M. Spano
confessed, and until 6 A. M. was driven around New York by police
93. See note 17 supra.
94. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
95. See note 18 supra.
96. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); see LAFAvE, ARREST 498 (1965).
97. See, e.g., Prof. Fred Inbau, Northwestern Univ. Law School, in "Most of the
Problem Comes Back to the Supreme Court," U.S. News & World Report, March 22,
1965, p. 40: "It seems to me that the judges ... from the Supreme Court on down -
have stimulated and encouraged an overemphasis on individual rights at the expense
of public welfare.... Some of our judges have the notion that the way to go down
in history as a great judge, like Oliver Wendell Holmes or Louis D. Brandeis, is to
devote all of their attention to the Bill of Rights - overlooking the fact that the Con-
stitution Preamble says the purpose of it all is to promote domestic tranquility and
public welfare." Ibid. "Q. Do the local courts have to follow the lead of the Supreme
Court? A. [Inbau] Yes, and it seems to me that most of the problem comes back to
the Supreme Court." Id. at 41. Professor Inbau was formerly an officer of the Chicago
police department. Ibid. See contra, Allison, He Needs a Lawyer Now, 42 J. AM. JuD.
Soc'Y 113 (1958); Rothblatt & Rothblatt, Police Interrogation: The Right to Counsel
and Prompt Arraignment, 27 BROOKLYN L. REV. 24 (1960). Note that in the quota-
tion in the text of Chief Justice Warren from Spano, the conflict exists within society;
not society versus criminals, as some commentators insist. In Escobedo, the rule is clear
even though the spokesmen of law enforcement insist otherwise: the officers of the
law must themselves obey the law of arrest in the performance of their duties. Spano
v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-31 (1959).
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officers until he identified the bridge from which he had thrown
the murder weapon. Spano's confession was introduced into evi-
dence at his trial and the issue of its voluntariness was submitted to
the jury under the rule in Stein v. New York.98 The jury apparently
found the confession voluntary and pronounced the defendant guilty
for which he was sentenced to death in the electric chair. The opinion
of the Court in reversing the conviction relied on the involuntariness
of the confession under the fourteenth amendment;99 however, four
concurring Justices indicated that the reversal should more appropri-
ately have been based on denial of the assistance of counsel.' Justice
Douglas declared: "what use is defendant's right to effective counsel
at every stage of a criminal case if, while he is held awaiting trial,
he can be questioned in the absence of counsel until he confesses?
In that event the secret trial in the police precincts effectively sup-
plants the public trial guaranteed by the Bill of Rights."''
For the first time, a substantial minority of four Justices were
willing to exclude a confession, regardless of its voluntariness or
reliability, where an indicted defendant had been denied the right to
see his lawyer during interrogation.
(3) Rogers v. Richmond.°---In the subsequent Rogers case,
the Court moved one step further in favoring the liberty of the indi-
vidual .from prohibited government action over the interest of the
state in promptly punishing guilty criminals.0 3 Defendant Rogers
98. 34 6 U.S. 156 (1953). Stein was subsequently overruled in Jackson v. Denno, 378
U.S. 368 (1964); see note 105 supra.
99. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 324 (1959).
100. Justice Stewart emphasized that Powell v. Alabama required counsel at every
stage of the proceedings, and here Spano had already been indicted for murder, and
the object of police interrogation "was ... to secure a verdict sending ... [Spano] to
the electric chair." Id. at 327 (concurring opinion). Justice Stewart five years later
rewrote his theory expounded in Spano to exclude the "admissions" made by defendant
in Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), in a 7-2 majority opinion for the
Court.
101. .Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 326 (1959) (concurring opinion). The
only apparent difference in the two concurring opinions is that Justice Douglas based
the defendant's right on the Bill of Rights whereas Justice Stewart relied on the four-
teenth amendment.
102. 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
103. As pointed out by Chief Justice Warren in Spano, the alternative was "prompt
and efficient law enforcement .... " See text accompanying note 96 supra (Emphasis
added.) In each case on appeal where a confession is excluded because illegal, the
state has the right to lawfully retry the defendant. However, these few cases decided
in the Supreme Court are numerically unimportant compared to the vast effect of the
exclusionary rule on present and future cases of everyday occurance in state criminal
courts. Now, the prosecuting authority must either (1) follow the law as to providing
1965]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
was arrested in connection with a robbery and murder in Connecti-
cut and illegally transported from the jail to the state attorney's of-
fice for questioning. During the first six hours of interrogation his
request to see his retained lawyer was refused. Later, the police
chief threatened to arrest Rogers' wife, who was ill with arthritis,
unless Rogers confessed, which he then did. The next day his law-
yer was refused permission to see him. Shortly thereafter, Rogers
was taken before the coroner, where he again confessed. The trial
court and the jury decided there was no coercion and defendant was
convicted of murder. The Supreme Court did not recognize as con-
trolling the right to assistance of counsel, but ruled instead that the
Connecticut test, the probable truthfulness and reliability of the con-
fession, though coerced, was a constitutionally impermissible one
under the fourteenth amendment. Justice Frankfurter for the Court
said:
[C]onvictions following the admission into evidence of con-
fessions which are involuntary, i.e., the product of coercion, either
physical or psychological, cannot stand .... not because such con-
fessions are unlikely to be true but because the methods used
to extract them offend an underlying principle in the enforcement
of our criminal law: that ours is an accusatorial and not an
inquisitorial system - a system in which the State must establish
guilt by evidence independently and freely secured and may not
by coercion prove its charge against an accused out of his own
mouth.
1 0 4
After the Court's rejection of the "probable reliability of a con-
fession"'0 5 as a permissible test in state prosecutions, there remained
only the federal due process test of coercion - was the confession
voluntary or involuntary?'
counsel, or (2) be able to prove defendants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt without
an illegally obtained confession. The latter is frequently not easy; moreover, the
police and prosecutor recognize the immense impact of a signed confession on the jury.
As one police advisor has said, "It is the quintessence of Evidence."
104. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961).
105. "[Tjhe historic primary ground ... for being cautious about admission of con-
fessions is that some of them are potentially delusive and carry high peril of undue prej-
udice .... Plainly enough the surest way to screen is to have the judge, and the judge
alone, determine all preliminary facts affecting acceptability. The worst way to conduct
the safeguarding job . . . [is to submit the issue of voluntariness to the jury]." MA-
GUIRE, EVIDENcE OF GUILT 130 (1959). Professor Maguire's suggestion that the
judge decide the issue of coercion as a matter of law was subsequently adopted by the
Supreme Court. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
106. One critical comment on Rogers assaulted the rule because it ignored the truth,
protected the guilty and handcuffed the police. Snyder, Justice at the Expense of
Truth: A Comment on the Opinion in Rogers v. Richmond, 10 KAN. L. R.Ev. 425
(1962).
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In 1963 the Court decided Gideon v. Wainwright"0 7 holding
that the fourteenth amendment included the sixth amendment right
to assistance of counsel.
(4) Haynes v. Washington.'°S-The Court promptly moved
in Haynes to exclude confessions obtained from an accused after he
had asked to call his lawyer or family. There, the defendant was ar-
rested for robbery of a gas station. He admitted the robbery during
the auto trip to the police station with the officers who arrested him.
He was refused the request to see or call his lawyer or his family
until he signed a written confession, which he did after a five day
incommunicado detention. The Supreme Court held the confession
inadmissible and pointed specifically to a Washington state statute
which required the police to allow the accused to contact his friends
or attorney. The purpose of the statute is expressly to prohibit the
police from securing a coerced confession." 9 The Court said that "offi-
cial misconduct cannot but breed disrespect for the law, as well as
... [law] enforcement" 11 which reflected a judicial recognition of
Brandeis' demand that the government obey the law. The Court
characterized secret and incommunicado detention and interrogation
of a suspect as devices adopted and used to extort illegal confes-
sions.' Such conduct by law enforcement agencies violates due
process of law guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.
(5) Escobedo v. Illinois."--It remained for the 1964 case of
Escobedo to demonstrate the all inclusive sweep of federal power,
for here the Supreme Court ruled that the sixth amendment right to
the assistance of counsel directed the exclusion as evidence of con-
fessions obtained from an accused during his illegal detention with-
out the aid of requested counsel after arrest. As in the case of Mas-
siah v. United States,"' the stage in the proceedings at which de-
107. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
108. 373 U.S. 503 (1963),
109. WAsE. REV. CODE S 9.33.020 (1961): "Oppression under color of office ....
(5) No officer or person having the custody and control of the body or liberty of any
person under arrest, shall refuse permission to such arrested person to communicate
with his friends or with an attorney, nor subject any person under arrest to any form
of personal violence, intimidation, indignity or threats for the purpose of extorting
from such person incriminating statements or a confession. Any person violating the
provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." The United States Supreme
Court declined to follow the state court's application of this statute to the Haynes facts.
See State v. Haynes, 58 Wash. 2d 716, 364 P.2d 935 (1961).
110. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 519 (1963).
111. Id. at 514.
112. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
113. 377 U.S.-201 (1964); see also Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 327 (1959).
In Masiah, defendant was arrested and indicted for smuggling narcotics into the U.S.
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fendant has a right to counsel has become relatively meaningless:
the crucial factor is whether he is prejudiced during this period.
Defendant Escobedo was arrested by the Chicago police and taken
to the station for questioning. Soon thereafter his retained lawyer
made several attempts to see him, but was refused each time. The
attorney interviewed the police captain and read the Illinois stat-
ute114 to him, which required that the police allow the accused to
send for and see his lawyer."' The chief refused. At about 11:00
P. M. the same evening, the lawyer sighted his client in an office
through an open doorway, but was refused permission to see the ac-
cused until the police were through interrogating him."' The po-
lice employed the interrogation services of an officer who had grown
up in defendant's neighborhood to secure an admission that he was
involved in the murder." 7  Soon thereafter a state's attorney took
defendant's statements by asking him carefully framed questions with-
out first advising him of his constitutional rights," 8 viz.: (1) the
right to assistance of counsel at all stages in the proceedings; (2) the
privilege against self-incrimination; and (3) the absolute right to
remain silent. In this landmark case the Supreme Court held:" 9
He was released on bail after his indictment; but unknown to him his confederate was
acting for the government in seeking further information on the illicit drug ring. In
pursuance thereof, the government agent installed a radio transmitter under the front
seat of the confederate's car, and on one occasion, Massiah made self-incriminating
statements, which were overheard by the agent in his auto on his radio receiver. These
admissions were admitted into evidence and defendant was found guilty. The Supreme
Court held, relying on state prosecution precedents as well as federal precedents, "any
secret interrogation of the defendant, from and after the finding of the indictment,
without the protection afforded by the presence of counsel, contravences ... the funda-
mental rights of persons charged with crime." Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201,
205 (1964). Massiah relied on Spano v. New York, Powell v. Alabama, Hamilton v.
Alabama, White v. Maryland, Gideon v. Wainwright and Johnson v. Zerbst. Ibid.
114. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 5 477 (1959) (later repealed as of January 1, 1964):
". 229 All public officers, sheriffs, coroners, jailers, constables, or other persons having
custody of any person committed, imprisoned or restrained of his liberty... shall...
admit any practicing attorney at law of this state . . . to see and consult . . . alone
and in private at the jail or other place of custody; ... " Illinois Laws 398, 399 (1927).
Present Illinois law reads: "Any person committed, imprisoned or restrained of his
liberty for any cause whatever and whether or not such person is charged with an
offense shall ... be allowed to consult with any licensed attorney at law of this State
whom such person may desire to see or consult, alone and in private at the place of cus-
tody .... " ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 38 § 103-4 (1964). Section 103-8 provides punish-
ment for any peace officer who prevents the exercise of any rights provided by the
code for an accused.
'115. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
116. Id. at 480-82.
117. Id. at 482.
118. Id. at 483.
119. Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958) and Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S.
504 (1958) were essentially overruled. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 492 (1964).
[Vol 16:725
Right to Counsel on Arrest
Our Constitution, unlike some others, strikes the balance in favor
of the right of the accused to be advised by his lawyer of his
privilege against self-incrimination.'20
[H]istory amply shows that confessions have often been ex-
torted to save law enforcement officials the trouble and effort of
obtaining valid and independent evidence.12 '
[W]here... the investigation is no longer a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular
suspect ... [in] police custody, the police carry out a process of
interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating state-
ments, [and] the suspect has requested and been denied an oppor-
tunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively
warned him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent,
the accused has been denied "the assistance of Counsel' in violation
of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution as "made obligatory
upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment" . . . and no state-
ment elicited by the police during the interrogation may be used
against him at a criminal trial.' 22
Thus, the rule of exclusion of confessions and admissions against the
states became the law of the United States.
On the one hand, it has been suggested that in Massiah and
Escobedo the Court has created a constitutional right not to confess,
except knowingly or with the tactical assistance of counsel.' 23 On
the other hand, it is argued that the true object of the Court was to
eliminate only coerced confessions. 4  The rule in Escobedo dosely
approximates a prior suggested compromise .2 between the McNabb-
Mallory rule and current state procedure of ignoring the prompt ar-
raignment statute: "A balance can and should be struck between
these two extremes. Delay for interrogative purposes should be per-
mitted, but only if the purpose of the interrogation is investigatory,
i.e., with a view toward solving the crime rather than convicting the
suspect."'28 A careful examination of the rule in Escobedo indicates
that it is not as "tough" on law enforcement agencies as claimed."-
The rule of exclusion operates only when (1) the investigation
focuses on the suspect as the accused; and (2) he asks for counsel,
and (3) he is not adequately warned of his right to remain
120. Escobedo v. Illinois, supra note 119, at 488.
121. Id. at 490.
122. Id. at 490-91.
123. Enker & Elsen, supra note 82, at 61.
124. Id. at 69.
125. Rothblatt & Rothblatt, Police Interrogation: The Right to Counsel and to Prompt
Arraignment, 27 BRooKLYN L. REv. 24 (1960).
126. Id. at 47.
127. See note 97 supra.
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silent, and (4) he is refused the right to see retained counsel.28
Thus, it would be inaccurate to genuinely say the Court has "hand-
cuffed" the police. Probably the most enlightened response is to im-
prove the quality of police scientific procedures, techniques of prose-
cution, and police selection and training. 2 '
There is no proof that the appropriate adjustments cannot be
made to Escobedo, for as amply demonstrated elsewhere in this
Note, the exclusionary rule of McNabb-Mallory.3 ° has not destroyed
law enforcement in the District of Columbia,' as first alarmingly
predicted.'
III. OHIO CASES ON CONFESSIONS, UNLAWFUL
DETENTION, AND RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Following a mixed pattern similar to the federal cases, the Ohio
courts have decided numerous complex criminal cases which in-
volved all three issues - voluntariness of a confession, denial of
counsel, and delay in court appearance - yet were decided primarily
on one of these issues. Consequently, this section will review the
cases on the basis of the predominant issue presented.
A. Ohio Confession Cases"3
(1) Snook v. State.' 4-T he most important Ohio case in-
volving an involuntary confession issue and denial of counsel is
the Snook case which involved a prominent university professor who
had been convicted of first degree murder.
After his arrest, defendant was removed to the jail where he
was questioned continuously for twenty-four hours without sleep
by many police officers and prosecutors. He was cursed and menaced
by police officers. At 7 A. M. on the day of interrogation, de-
128. See text accompanying notes 120-22 supra. But see People v. Dorado, 42 Cal.
Reptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361 (Sup. Ct. 1965), where the California Supreme Court went
beyond Escobedo and ruled that the suspect must be warned of his right to remain silent
and his right to counsel. Id. at 179, 398 P.2d at 371. Accord, State v. Neely, 398 P.2d
482 (Ore. 1965); State v. Allen, 398 P.2d 477 (Ore. 1965).
129. Kamisar, Public Safety v. Individual Liberties: Some "Facts" and 'Theories," 53
J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 171, 181 (1962).
130. See text accompanying note 316 infra.
131. The District operates a police force and law enforcement system similar to
most urban cities.
132. See text accompanying note 317 infra.
133. The one U.S. Supreme Court confession case arising in Ohio, Haley v. Ohio,
332 U.S. 596 (1948), has never been cited as authority for excluding a confession in
an Ohio report.
134. 34 Ohio App. 60,170 N.E. 444 (1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 722 (1930).
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fendant saw his attorney. Upon resumption of the interrogation,
the attorney was ejected because he had counseled defendant to re-
main silent. Thereafter, according to defendant, the prosecutor
struck him four or five times in the face. The state did not deny
these acts. Soon thereafter defendant gave his first confession.
Later that day at about midnight he was awakened, and he agreed
to talk to reporters. In the presence of reporters, police officers
and prosecutors, defendant gave what amounted to his second con-
fession. Both of these confessions were introduced at trial. Later,
defendant took the stand in his own defense. He admitted some
acts but denied cutting his paramour's throat.
A primary issue was the voluntariness of the confession. The
court of appeals held that third degree methods were unconstitu-
tional but declined to reverse the conviction because (1) counsel
failed at trial to offer the proper objections, exceptions, and alter-
nate instructions, and (2) there was other sufficient evidence to
convict defendant without the confessions, i.e., his testimony. The
court failed to state, however, that defendant would probably not
have taken the stand but for the "confessions." The court also
ruled that the jury could decide if by the time of the second con-
fession the coercive effect of the twenty-four hour interrogation and
first confession has been removed so that it might be declared
voluntary. Since the jury found defendant guilty, it must have de-
cided the confessions voluntary. The court held that defendant had
a right to counsel and that he was allowed to see his lawyer even
though he had to get a mandatory injunction from the court to
get into the jail, and even though he was ejected from the jail
during the interrogation of the defendant. Moreover, the court
held that even though the law was dear that the authorities in
control of a prisoner may not threaten him, and here they admittedly
did, the state could execute a man because he was proven the prob-
able murderer, and his counsel failed to make the proper requests to
instruct the jury.
Snook was subject to all of the evils of 1929 interrogation
practices- physical violence, prolonged questioning by relays of
police and prosecutors, insulted, badgered, and held incommunicado
for days without being brought before a magistrate. The theory of
the case was dear, however; the brutality of the crime and the
probable guilt of the accused were so great as to overcome the con-
stitutional and statutory rights.. 5 of the accused. The considerable
135. The Ohio Constitution contains all of the elements of the federal Bill of Rights
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pressure of public opinion and the press to get a conviction cannot
be overlooked in a case of this sensational character.
The permissive attitude of the court toward the police practices
of that day seem to approve Sir Stephan's now famous colonial
police vignette. "It is far pleasanter to sit comfortably in the shade,
rubbing red pepper into some poor devil's eyes, than to go about
in the sun hunting up evidence."' 36
(2) State v. Klumpp.' 3 7-Defendant, a forty-year-old woman,
was tried and convicted of the murder of her paramour's wife. Evi-
dence indicated she purchased a can of gasoline, then shot the wife,
put the body in the trunk of her car and attempted to burn the body
in a state park. She was sentenced to death in the electric chair.
On being taken into custody she made certain written admissions
which were introduced at her trial. There was no confession. 3 '
The issue was the voluntariness of the admissions based on
failure of the police to allow defendant to see counsel and, a false
inducement by the police that if defendant confessed she would be
charged with only manslaughter. This was denied by the police,
but they admitted discussing the various degrees of homicide which
might result from defendant's testimony.
The court of appeals held that the admissions were voluntarily
given, relying on the decision by the trial judge and on the sub-
mission of the issue of voluntariness to the jury.'39 The court fur-
ther held that defendant was not denied the right to see her attorney
for she never made a demand to see or contact an attorney. Prior
to making some of the admissions she asked "When may I have an
attorney?" The police told her it would be "when the police in-
vestigation is over."' 40  However, there was no express demand by
defendant, and her counsel, who appeared at the station that night,
departed without demanding to see the accused.
The illegal delay in preliminary hearing after arrest did not
here pertinent; right to assistance of counsel, privilege against self-incrimination and the
right against unlawful seizures.
136. Stephan in WIGMORE, EvIDENCE 389 (Student's Text ed. 1935); see note 287
infra.
137. 175 N.E.2d 767 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
138. "Confession has been defined as the voluntary admission . .. by a person who
has committed a crime.., of his ... participation in the crime.... [An] admission...
acknowledges, directly or impliedly, only some particular fact or circumstance which
tends to prove guilt." Id. at 770-71.
139. It is important to note that the voluntariness of a confession is now a question
of law for the decision of the judge. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
140. State v. Klumpp, 175 N.E.2d 767, 773 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
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make the admissions inadmissible as a matter of law and the ques-
tion of admissibility was held to be one of fact for the jury.
Klumpp demonstrates the difficulties of all self-incrimination
cases - conflicting stories by the accused and police as to occurrences
while the defendant was in secret police custody.
(3) State v. Scarberry. 41 -During an argument with his wife,
defendant took two children he believed the wife had had by another
man under his arms and disappeared toward a river, saying he was
going to drown them. Shortly thereafter he appeared at a house across
the river, wet, cold and upset, and without the two infants. Mean-
while, the wife called the sheriff, who with many other persons
searched the entire area for the children, but they were never found.
The next morning a city detective slapped defendant in the face
when taking him to the interrogation room. After about three
hours of questioning, defendant signed a confession which was
introduced at his trial. He was convicted of first degree murder
and sentenced to life imprisonment.
On the issue of the voluntariness of the confession, it was held:
(1) while the slap was illegal it did not amount to coercion be-
cause its minor effect had worn off by the time of defendant's con-
fession three hours later; (2) defendant was not abused or coerced
in any other way and the officer who hit him did not participate in
the interrogation; and (3) there was sufficient evidence independent
of the confession to prove corpus delicti.
Scarberry is a modern Ohio confession case which marks a point
in the grey voluntary-involuntary area. Apparently, a slap in the
face by a detective and three hours of police interrogation prior to
bringing the accused before a magistrate did not in 1961 "poison"
a confession.
B. Unlawful Detention and Arrest Without Probable Cause
(1) State v. Collett.142-- The previously discussed confession
cases are closely related to Collett because defendant was convicted
solely on the basis of a confession obtained after a long period of
detention.
Defendant was convicted of a triple murder of his relatives, re-
sulting from a quarrel over the payment of rent on property in-
herited from a common ancestor. On defendant's arrest by the
141. 114 Ohio App. 85, 180 N.E.2d 631 (1961).
142. 58 N.X.2d 417 (Ohio Ct. App. 1944), appeal dismissed, 144 Ohio St. 557,
60 N.E.2d 170 (1945).
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sheriff, he was taken 170 miles by auto to the Toledo police de-
partment where he was interrogated in the polygraph room for
nine hours, during which time he was not allowed out of the room
or given food. He alleged that he was told he would not be
allowed out of the room unless he confessed; that if he would
confess he would only get one year in jail; that men over sixty as
defendant were never sent to prison; and that he would be put in
an asylum. Moreover, the defendant said the Toledo police threat-
ened him with violence if he did not confess. All of these allega-
tions were denied by the state, and it was insisted that defendant
never complained or asked for anything.
The court of appeals decided that the McNabb rule did not
apply to state cases; hence the Ohio statute requiring that the accused
be brought before a magistrate "without unnecessary delay" could
be ignored, or at least, that five days was not an unnecessary delay
in order to get a confession. The state admitted that there was
no evidence on which to arrest or convict defendant without his
confession. The court further held that the nine hour interrogation
of defendant in the Toledo polygraph room did not render the con-
fession inadmissible under Ashcraft v. Tennessee.
Collett undoubtedly marks an extreme point in the Ohio law
of confessions and unlawful detention. Today, under current
decisions like Wong Sun v. United States, Beck v. Ohio, Mapp
v. Ohio, and State v. Domer in the Ohio Court of Appeals, it is
questionable whether such a conviction could stand, for the ma-
terial facts are repugnant to current due process standards: (1) a
five day delay in preliminary hearing is too long under Domer;
(2) under Beck the officers did not have probable cause; (3) under
Wong Sun there was insufficient independent evidence to corrobo-
rate the confession; and (4) a nine-hour period of interrogation of an
old man in a polygraph chair143 after an all-night auto trip is in-
herently coercive under Spano.
The Ohio cases in the following section decided on the right-to-
counsel-at-arrest issue are different from the confession and detention
cases, however, because they did not become involved in the guilt
of an accused but rather were able to take a more objective view of
the constitutional and statutory rights of citizens.
143. One police investigator expressed the idea that interrogation of a suspect in a
polygraph chair was more conducive to a confession because of its similarity to the
electric chair. Mueller, The Law Relating to Police Interrogation Privileges and Limita-
tions, 52 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 2, 11 (1961).
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C. Ohio Right to Counsel Cases
In Thomas v. Mills,44 the Ohio Supreme Court made an im-
portant decision recognizing the basic right to assistance of coun-
sel'45 emanating from the Ohio Constitution of 1912. Thomas v.
Mills was a 1927 injunction action by an attorney to compel the
warden of the Ohio Penitentiary to allow him to privately visit his
client in the penitentiary, where the client was committed after
being convicted of murder. The attorney sought these conferences
with his client to prepare the appeal of his conviction. The warden
refused to allow the attorney to see the convict.
The Ohio court held that article 1, section 1614" of the Ohio
Constitution requires that an attorney be allowed to confer with
his client where there is a pending appeal of conviction.' The court
said: "It may be conceded that consultation with counsel is -a neces-
sary part of every defense, and such consultation rightly should
take place not merely during the actual stages of the trial, but at
every point in the proceedings." ' Moreover, the court specifically
interpreted the broad right to counsel as one guaranteed by the
constitution: 4 ' "[Elvery person shall have justice administered
without denial or delay. Surely the right to be represented by coun-
sel in every stage of a criminal proceeding is a right inherent in
justice itself, and any person who is denied the right is denied jus-
tice. ,149
In the 1936 case of Stal ex rel. Chase v. City of Cleveland...
an attorney sought and obtained a writ of mandamus to compel the
Cleveland police to allow him to see his client, a ten-year-old girl
held incommunicado by the police as a material witness. The court
expressly relied on Thomas v. Mills in recognizing the right of a
person held in custody to see and consult with an attorney. The
attorney, furthermore, in his petition relied on a statute as creating
144. 117 Ohio St. 114, 157 N.E. 488 (1927).
145. In this 1927 case the issue was limited to the right of assistance of a retained
lawyer. The question of an indigent's right to a lawyer's services before or after trial
is still an unsettled problem in the law. See generally Allison, supra note 97, at 118.
146. "All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his land,
goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and shall have
justice administered without denial or delay."
147. Thomas v. Mills, 117 Ohio St. 114, 119, 157 N.E. 488, 489 (1927).
148. Art. 1, § 16.
149. Thomas v. Mills, 117 Ohio St. 114, 120, 157 N.E. 488, 490 (1927).
150. 130 Ohio St. 587, 200 N.E. 840 (1936).
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a right to consult with counsel.' These cases are still vital for they
are founded on the Ohio Constitution of 1912,152 which is still in
effect.
The 1929 case of State v. Snook 53 and the 1960 case of State
v. Klumpp'54 both involved questions of the right to the assistance
of counsel. However, the Ohio courts considered the issue as col-
lateral because of the rule that a confession was admissible if reliable
and truthful. That rule was not declared unconstitutional until the
1961 case of Rogers v. Richmond.55
All of the confession cases in Ohio and those decided by the
United States Supreme Court have involved the right of a suspect
or arrestee to consult with a retained lawyer. In 1963 the Ohio
Supreme Court had occasion to consider the question of whether
due process required the state to appoint counsel for the indigent be-
fore trial." The court held: "It might be well to point out,
however, that, although in this case failure to appoint counsel to
an indigent accused prior to his arraignment did not constitute a
denial of rights or defenses, the preferable procedure is that coun-
sel be appointed prior to arraignment."' 57
The problem of supplying counsel to the indigent prior to trial
is a difficult administrative problem. Perhaps, compliance with the
prompt arraignment' statutes and the modern no-bail program for
the poor' 59 will solve the vast majority of felony detention cases.
However, such remedial programs cannot do much for the person
accused of a capital crime because it is usually non-bailable, nor will
it alleviate the dispute over probable cause for arrest under the fourth
amendment.' °
151. OHio GEN. CODE § 13432-15 (now partially included in OHIO REV. CODE
2935.14, .16 (Supp. 1964)).
152. See note 146 supra.
153. See text accompanying note 134 supra.
154. See text accompanying note 137 supra.
155. See text accompanying note 102 supra.
156. Dean v. Maxwell, 174 Ohio St. 193, 187 N.E.2d 884 (1963), cert denied, 374
U.S. 839 (1964).
157. Id. at 197, 187 N.E.2d at 887.
158. In Ohio, the "prompt arraignment" term is misleading. The first judicial ap-
pearance is the initial appearance, second is the preliminary hearing, and third is the
arraignment at which time a plea is entered. See notes 192-96 infra.
159. Editors, Punishment Before Trial, 48 J. AM. Jun. Soc'y 6 (1964) (discussion of
abuses in the bail system); Cox, Bail Reform Program Launched, Cleveland Plain
Dealer, April 18, 1965, pp. 1-A, 11-A, (Cleveland no-bail program); Cleveland Plain
Dealer, April 18, 1965, p. 12-AA (Toledo no-bail program).
160. See text accompanying note 213-16 infra.
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D. State v. Domer 6'
The first Ohio case reflecting the massive upheaval of federal
constitutional decisions in this field is the Domer case decided by
the Ohio Court of Appeals late in 1964."02
Defendant Robert Domer was indicted for first degree murder
and felony-murder in Stark County, Ohio. He elected to be tried
by three judges of the common pleas court, which found him
guilty of first degree murder and sentenced him to death in the electric
chair. Upon review by the Court of Appeals of Ohio, the convic-
tion was reversed on numerous grounds of error, "3 one of the most
161. 1 Ohio App. 2d 155, 204 N.E.2d 69 (1964).
162. Ibid. An earlier reported case argued on the basis of Escobedo was State v. Puc-
kett, 201 N.E.2d 86 (Ohio C.P. 1964). The court held that there was no denial of Con-
stitutional rights because (1) the sheriff allowed the defendant to call his relatives on
his arrest but they were unable to engage counsel for him, (2) the defendant made no
incriminating statements to the sheriff during his interrogation, and (3) the state is
under no absolute duty to appoint counsel on arrest of an indigent. The court noted
that counsel was appointed to represent the defendant after his indictment by the grand
jury and prior to his trial in common pleas court. However, he had no counsel at the
judicial proceedings in the county court.
163. The Ohio Court of Appeals identified the following errors in the proceedings:
(1) Double jeopardy.-The trial court erred in ruling that a defendant cannot be
tried for two crimes, ie., felony-murder and first degree murder, arising out of the
same criminal act. State v. Domer, 1 Ohio App. 2d 155, 156, 204 N.E.2d 69, 72
(1964).
(2) Denial of Right to Counsel-The prosecuting attorney committed prejudicial mis-
conduct when he refused the defendant's request to see his lawyer after his arrest. Id.
at 157, 165, 204 N.E.2d at 72-73, 77.
(3) Duties of the Warden in Executing Sentence.-The court erred in setting the
date of execution of defendant's sentence of death in the electric chair. Id. at 159, 204
N.E.2d at 74.
(4) Defendant's Offer to Plead Guilty Transmitted to Trial Court.-Prejudicial error
was committed whereby the prosecutor informed the trial court prior to the verdict and
sentence that the defendant had offered to plead guilty to second degree murder. Id.
at 159, 204 N.E.2d at 74.
(5) Failure of State to Prove Venue.-The State failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the venue of the alleged crime was in Stark County and the evidence indi-
cates the incineration took place in Wayne County. Id. at 163, 167, 204 N.E.2d at
76-77, 79.
(6) Failure to Prove Incineration of Victim as Means of Murder.-The evidence
adduced at trial failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim was alive at
the time defendant set fire to the body as there was no carbon monoxide in the victim's
blood. Id. at 164, 204 N.E.2d at 77.
(7) Coerced Self-Incrimination of Defendant.-The court erred in requiring the de-
fendant on cross-examination to testify to the commission of illegal acts. Id. at 165-66,
204 N.E.2d at 78-79.
(8) Weight of the Evidence Review on Appeal.-There was insufficient substantial
evidence to support the judgment of the court. Id. at 169, 204 N.E.2d at 81. In
other terminology, the court of appeals held that the state failed to carry the burden of
production of evidence as a matter of law and that the court's decision was not based
on the weight of the evidence test, which in this case would be a decision for the triers
of fact. See 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2487 (3d ed. 1940).
(9) Illegal Arrest and Detention of Defendant.-The court of appeals held that it was
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important rulings being that defendant was denied the assistance of
counsel as guaranteed by the United States Constitution.'64
The defendant was an officer of a Canton mortgage company
who decided to abandon his home because of his inability to restore
improper loans.'65 The defendant left his home on April 1, 1963
and travelled around northeast Ohio. On about April 18th he
met Howard F. Riddle, an itinerant fruit peddler, in an Akron
bar.'66 Riddle suffered from heart disease and apparently died from
it in the defendant's motel room on April 22d. The defendant
testified he became fearful of complicity over Riddle's demise, put
the body in his car and drove around until the next night, when
in order to feign his own accidental death, he set fire to the body
and his car and pushed the car down a hill. 1 ' After about five days
of hiding, Domer returned to his home, where on April 28th he was
arrested without a warrant by the Stark County authorities and taken
into custody. His demand to see his lawyer was refused. 6 ' Con-
trary to the statutes,6 9 he was transported out of Stark County to
Summit County for questioning. The defendant was then held in
jail for five days before being indicted by the grand jury and charged
with a crime. 7° During his detention prior to his indictment and be-
ing taken before the Canton Municipal Court for arraignment, the
defendant made numerous requests to see his lawyer, all of which
clearly illegal to arrest defendant without a warrant and hold him for 5 days in jail
prior to his arraignment. Id. at 170, 204 N.E.2d at 81. Issuance of warrant. -
Upon the filing of an affidavit or complaint as provided in sections 2935.05
or 2935.06 of the Revised Code such judge, clerk, or magistrate shall forth-
with issue a warrant to the peace officer making the arrest, or if made by a
private person, to the most convenient peace officer who shall receive custody
of the person arrested. All further detention and further proceedings shall
be pursuant to such affidavit or complaint and warrant. OHIO REV. CODE
§ 2935.08 (Supp. 1964).
Announcement of charge and rights of accused by court, § 2937.02 OHIO REv. CODE
(Supp. 1964). See note 195 infra.
164. The Ohio Court of Appeals apparently relied on these recent decisions of the
United States Supreme Court on right to counsel: Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Haynes v. Washington, 373
U.S. 503 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Rogers v. Richmond,
365 U.S. 534 (1961); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
165. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, p. 4, State v. Domer, 1 Ohio App. 2d 155, 204
N.E.2d 69 (1964).
166. Brief for Defendant-Appellant, p. 16, State v. Domer, 1 Ohio App. 2d 155, 204
N.E.2d 69 (1964).
167. Id. at 23, 39, 61-64, 65, 66.
168. Id. at 115.
169. Ibid.
170. Id. at 115, 130.
[VOL 16:725
Right to Counsel on Arrest
were denied. 7' At the trial, the state introduced evidence con-
sisting of Domer's pre-arraignment statements and admissions to
the sheriff and prosecutor. This testimony was damaging to the
defendant because of the admissions, evasions, and misrepresenta-
tions Domer had made during this period.172 Defendant was proven
by his own prior statements to be untruthful and his credibility as to
his version of the victim's death and incineration was impeached, not
by direct evidence, but indirectly by destroying his reputation for
truth and veracity.'
The misconduct of the sheriff and prosecutor in refusing to per-
mit Domer to see his lawyer and the error of the trial court in ad-
mitting evidence of defendant's conduct and statements during the
period of unlawful arrest and detention constituted a basis for re-
versing the defendant's conviction. 74 The Ohio Court of Appeals
held that "a prosecutor owes the duty to see to it that due process
is afforded a defendant. Under the authority of a number of re-
cent cases of the Supreme Court of the United States the . . .
prejudicial conduct of the prosecuting attorney would be sufficient
grounds to reverse the judgment here entered."'7 5
Two principal grounds relied on by the Ohio court were (1) a
failure by the sheriff and prosecutor to allow the defendant to
consult his lawyer on arrest,'76 and (2) the unlawfulness of the
detention because the Ohio statute clearly requires the accused to
be brought before a court or magistrate forthwith. 7 Moreover,
defendant was illegally removed from the site of his initial detention
when he was transported to Summit County to be interrogated there
and forced to view various places where he had met the deceased
or hidden prior to his arrest.' 8 Section 2935.14" of the Ohio
171. Ibid.
172. Reply Brief for Defendant-Appellant, p. 9, State v. Domer, 1 Ohio App. 2d 155,
204 N.E.2d 69 (1964).
173. Numerous criminal defendants have been convicted by such indirect proof. The
prosecutor - assuming the defendant takes the stand - first destroys his reputation
for telling the truth by forcing him to admit a prior lie. It need not be relevant or even
material. Then, he infers to the jury that the defendant is lying about his alibi or
version of the crime. The most notorious example of this was the trial of Bruno Haupt-
mann for the Lindberg kidnapping. State v. Hauptnann, 115 NJ.L. 412, 180 Ad.
809, cert. denied, 296 U.S. 649 (1935).
174. See note 46 supra.
175. State v. Domer, 1 Ohio App. 2d 155, 157, 204 N.E.2d 69, 73 (1964).
176. Ibid.
177. Id. at 170, 204 NE.2d at 81.
178. Id. at 157, 204 N.X.2d at 73.
179. OHIO REV. CODE (Supp. 1964).
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Revised Code specifically prohibits the removal of a prisoner from
the county of arrest until he has seen his lawyer: "[The prisoner]
shall not. . . be . . . removed from the county or from the sims
of initial detention until such attorney has had reasonable oppor-
tunity to confer with him....
The facts of the Domer case demonstrate that the sheriff and
prosecutor failed to follow these statutes."' Clearly then, the de-
tention procedure was unlawful. The remedy dictated by the
Supreme Court was exclusion of the admissions, statements, con-
duct, and all other evidence - including those items used to at-
tack defendant's credibility - made by the defendant during his
unlawful five day detention.
The Domer case makes a great deal of new law in Ohio, for
failure of the police, prosecutor, or jailer to give the accused prompt
consultation privileges with his attorney.82 is ground for reversal
of conviction. The demand must be complied with or the convic-
tion is subject to being reversed by either state or federal courts.
By a process of inclusion or absorption the fourteenth amendment
now includes the specific guarantees of the federal Bill of Rights;
and the sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel denied
Robert Domer by the Stark County authorities clearly invoked the
exclusionary rule of Escobedo, as recognized by the Ohio Court of
Appeals.'83
Considering the great weight put on state statutes in Haynes,
Escobedo, and Domer, the Ohio statutes on arrest and preliminary
hearing deserve examination.
IV. PRESENT OHIO STATUTES RELATING TO RIGHT TO
COUNSEL ON ARREST AND DETENTION AND THE RIGHT
To PROMPT APPEARANCE BEFORE A MAGISTRATE
In 1960 the Ohio legislature completely revamped the code of
criminal procedure regulating pretrial arrest, arraignment, prelimi-
180. See note 186 infra for full text of statute. The Ohio Court of Appeals did not
specifically state that § 2935.14 was violated, however, no other statute specifically re-
quires the prisoner to be held at the initial situs of arrest until he has seen his lawyer.
181. See text accompanying note 170 supra.
182. Counsel for indigent defendants at arrest has not been considered. Cf. Hamilton
v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961), where the state conviction was reversed because de-
fendant did not have assigned counsel at arraignment, for this was the critical stage in
the proceedings. Who can say that the step immediately prior to the making of a
written confession is not the most critical stage in any case? See text accompanying
note 250 infra.
183. See text accompanying note 164 supra.
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nary hearing, and ancillary matters. 84 Two sections of this law
relate to the rights of the arrested person to consult with his law-
yer.'
85
A. Section 2935.14: Right of Person Arrested
An arrested person must be speedily permitted facilities to com-
municate with an attorney or a relative prior to confinement. More-
over, he may not be removed from the situs of initial detention until
the attorney has had a reasonable opportunity to confer with him.
A police officer or jailer who violates this section shall be fined
$100 to $500 and up to 30 days in jail. 8 '
184. 128 Ohio Laws 97 (1959) (effective Jan. 1, 1960). More than half of the
states have similar statutes. Comment, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 641, 646. In the 1963-1964
legislative session, the 105th Ohio General Assembly passed a bill to re-enact a section
of the former code repealed in 1960. H.B. 419 was passed by the unanimous vote of
both houses but vetoed by the governor. H.B. 419 was identical in every material
feature with former OHIO REV. CODE § 2935.16 which had been the law for many years.
In the 106th Ohio General Assembly, the same statute was proposed as § 2935.20, H.B.
No. 471. In a House Judiciary Committee it was amended and approved by the com-
mittee as Substitute H.B. No. 471, and it presently awaits a floor vote. Because of the
16-16 split in party strength in the Ohio Senate, however, all current legislation is of
indefinite enactment. Letter from Representative Carl B. Stokes to author, April 22,
1965. The text of Substitute H.B. No. 471 is:
Sec. 2935.20. After the arrest, detention, or any other taking into custody
of a person, with or without a warrant, such person shall be speedily permitted
facilities to communicate with any other person of his own choice for the pur-
pose of obtaining counsel. Such communication may be made by a reason-
able number of telephone calls or in any other reasonable manner. Such
person shall have a right to be immediately visited by any attorney at law
so obtained who is entitled to practice in the courts of this state, and to consult
with him privately. No officer or any other agent of this state shall prevent,
attempt to prevent, or advise such person against the communication, visit
or consultation provided for by this section.
Whoever violates this section shall be fined not less than twenty-five nor
more than one hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than thirty days, or
both.
The present bill overcomes the objection of the governor to former § 2935.16, that it
might "give color to the suspicion that solicitation of legal business among newly ar-
rested persons ... [is approved]." Letter from Representative Carl B. Stokes to author,
April 22, 1965. The explicit purpose of the present bill proposed by Representative
Stokes is to guarantee the right of an accused person to retain counsel at arrest and the
right to immediately telephone and consult with a lawyer. Cleveland Plain Dealer,
April 11, 1965, p. 11-AA.
185. OIo REv. CODE §§ 2935.14, .16 (Supp. 1964).
186. OHIO REV. CODE § 2935.14 (Supp. 1964):
If the person arrested is unable to offer sufficient bail or, if the offense
charged be a felony, he shall, prior to being confined or removed from
the county of arrest, as the case may be, be speedily permitted facilities to
communicate with an attorney at law of his own choice, or to communicate
with at least one relative or other person for the purpose of obtaining counsel
(or in cases of misdemeanors or ordinance violation for the purpose of ar-
ranging bail). He shall not thereafter be confined or removed from the county
or from the situs of initial detention until such attorney has had reasonable
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B. Section 2935.16: Prisoners Held Without Process
Any judge or magistrate may by summary process order any of-
ficial having custody of a prisoner to bring the prisoner before him,
when, by any means, he learns that such prisoner has not been com-
mitted to custody by a court. If the prisoner is held without process
- an arrest warrant or affidavit after arrest - the court must order
the prisoner brought before it and charged. A custodian or jailer
who violates this section shall be fined $100 to $500 and jailed up
to 90 days.18
7
The Ohio Supreme Court in Thomas v. Mills interpreted a simi-
lar statute... which made the action of a jailer or the police which
prevented a prisoner from communicating or consulting with his at-
torney a misdemeanor. The Ohio Supreme Court in 1927 recog-
nized that the purpose of the legislature was to expressly embody in
the statutes the right of one held in custody by the police to commu-
nicate with his lawyer and consult with him as to his rights.'89 More-
opportunity to confer with him privately, or other person to arrange bail,
under such security measures as may be necessary under the circumstances.
Whoever, being a police officer in charge of a prisoner, or the custodian of
any jail or place of confinement, violates this section shall be fined not less
than one hundred nor more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not
more than thirty days, or both.
See also Comment, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 641, 646-47.
187. OHIO REV. CODE § 2935.16 (Supp. 1964):
When it comes to the attention of any judge or magistrate that a prisoner
is being held in any jail or place of custody in his jurisdiction without com-
mitment from a court or magistrate, he shall forthwith, by summary process,
require the officer or person in charge of such jail or place of custody to dis-
close to such court or magistrate, in writing, whether or not he holds the per-
son described or identified in the process and the court under whose process
the prisoner is being held. If it appears from the disclosure that the prisoner
is held solely under warrant of arrest from any court or magistrate, the judge
or magistrate shall order the custodian to produce the prisoner forthwith be-
fore the court or magistrate issuing the warrant and if such be impossible for
any reason, to produce him before the inquiring judge or magistrate. If
it appears from the disclosure that the prisoner is held without process, such
judge or magistrate shall require the custodian to produce the prisoner forth-
with before him, there to be charged as provided in section 2935.06 of the
Revised Code.
Whoever, being the person in temporary or permanent charge of any jail
or place of confinement, violates this section shall be fined not less than one
hundred nor more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than
ninety days, or both.
This section has been referred to as the "poor man's habeas corpus" for if the prisoner
is held without being charged, he must be brought before the judge. If the prosecu-
tion is unable to charge the prisoner at that time, the judge will order his immediate
release.
188. Omo GEN. CODE. § 12856-1 (now partially included in OHIo REV. CoDE §
2935.16 (Supp. 1964)).
189. Thomas v. Mills, 117 Ohio St. 114, 124-25, 157 N.E. 488, 491 (1927).
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over, the Ohio statute is similar to that of the state of Washington
in Haynes and that of Illinois in Escobedo. The United States Su-
preme Court held in each case that the actions of the police in refus-
ing defendants' requests to see their lawyers were illegal under state
law, despite the fact that the state supreme court in each case had
held otherwise. Thus, the principle of suppressing illegal police con-
duct to protect the rights of incarcerated persons has been enforced
by means of the exclusionary rule.
Whether or not such a policy is wise is discussed infra.9 ' Stat-
utes of the above kind have been interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court as creating a right in behalf of the accused to the
assistance of counsel and not solely to punish the offending officer.
Moreover, where the police have failed to allow the prisoner to see
counsel, the Court has recognized that the prosecutor will not prose-
cute his own police force. Hence, the only effective deterrent is
exclusion of any evidence obtained during the period of illegal de-
tention, whether a confession, statement, admission or other evi-
dentiary matter. Both the Ohio Court of Appeals and counsel in
the Domer case neglected to consider these statutes. 9' Instead, the
190. See text accompanying note 199 infra.
191. It cannot be said these ideas are new. Since 1915, OHIo GEN. CODE § 12856-1
or its material equivalent has been the law of Ohio:
Penalty for depriving accused persons of counsel. Whoever, having charge of
a county jail, or a municipal jail, prison or station-house, in which jail,
prison, or station-house, any person suspected or accused or charged with the
commission of a crime or offense, is imprisoned or confined, refuses, upon
the request of such person, or any relative of such person, to permit such per-
son to consult or in any way prevents or attempts to prevent such person, from
consulting privately at any reasonable and proper hour, with any attorney-at-
law, duly admitted to practice in this state, for the purpose of enabling such
person to employ such attorney-at-law, or with any attorney-at-law duly ad-
mitted to practice in this state and employed by such person, shall be guilty of
a misdemeanor, and shall, on conviction, be fined not less that twenty-five
dollars nor more than one hundred dollars. 106 Ohio Laws 208 (1915).
Likewise, since 1929 OHIo GEN. CODE §§ 13432-15 and -16 have been basic law of
the state:
Right of attorney to visit prisoner. After the arrest of a person, with or with-
out a warrant, any attorney at law entitled to practice in the courts of this
state may, at the request of the prisoner, or any relative of such prisoner,
visit the person so arrested, and consult with him privately. Any officer
having a prisoner in charge, who refuses to allow any such attorney to im-
mediately visit the prisoner, when proper application is made therefore, shall
be fined not less than $25, nor more than $100, or imprisoned not more than
thirty days or both. OHIO GEN. CODE § 13432-15, 113 Ohio Laws 123
(1929).
Right of the accused to send for attorney. The court or magistrate must also
allow the accused a reasonable time to send for counsel, and for that purpose
may postpone the examination, and upon the request of the defendant, such
court or magistrate, or officer or officers having the accused in charge,
shall require a peace officer to take a message or to send a telephone
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court in Domer relied on sections 2935.05, 2937.02 and 2937.03.192
The essence of these statutes is that upon arrest without a war-
rant, the police must file an affidavit and the prosecutor must file
complaint forthwith'93 with the court.' Thereupon, the accused is
entitled to the Ohio initial appearance in which the court must in-
form the accused of (1) the charge, (2) the right to counsel and
a continuance to secure counsel, (3) the effect of various pleas and
the right to a jury trial, (4) the nature and extent of punishment
for the felony charged, and (5) the right to a preliminary hearing
wherein the prosecutor must present enough evidence to hold the
accused for indictment.'95  The above procedure is termed an "an-
message to any counsel the defendant may name, within the municipality
or township where such person is detained. The officer must without delay,
and without fee, carry such message or deliver such telephone message, and
upon failure so to do he shall be liable to the penalty provided in the next
preceding section. OHIO GEN. CODE § 13432-16 (1929), 113 Ohio laws
123, 143 (1929).
192. OHIO REV. CODE (Supp. 1964). Cato v. Alvis, 288 F.2d 530 (6th Cir. 1961),
held that where an accused was held for five days by the police, without a warrant and
statements taken during this period were used in evidence against defendant such police
action did not make the confession involuntary under the fourteenth amendment.
Moreover, while "the police did violate section 2935.05 of the Ohio Revised Code...
[and] we do not condone this . . . [T]he failure of the police to comply with this
section does not invalidate a subsequent conviction .... Id. at 532.
193. Forthwith means "immediately; without delay; .. .hence within a reasonable
time under the circumstances of the case .. " State ex rel. Bd. of Educ. v. Morley,
168 Okla. 259, 261, 34 P.2d 258, 261 (1934). "Sections ... [of the Ohio] Revised
Code, require immediate action upon arrest by a police officer without a warrant by
forthwith filing an affidavit charging the crime for which the arrest was made, securing
a warrant and serving it on the accused and forthwith taking the accused before a
magistrate...... State v. Domer, 1 Ohio App. 2d 155, 170, 204 N.E.2d 69, 81 (Em-
phasis added.)
194. OHIo REVISED CODE § 2935.05 (Supp. 1964):
Affidavit filed in case of arrest without warrant. When a person named in
section 2935.03 [sheriff, marshall, deputy, watchman, or police] of the Revised
Code has arrested a person without a warrant, he shall, without unnecessary
delay, take the person arrested before a court or magistrate having jurisdiction
of the offense, and shall file or cause to be filed an affidavit describing the
offense for which the person was arrested. Such affidavit shall be filed either
with the court or magistrate, or with the prosecuting attorney or other attorney
charged by law with prosecution of crimes before such court or magistrate
and if filed with such attorney he shall forthwith file with such court or magis-
trate a complaint, based on such affidavit.
195. OHIO REV. CODE § 2937.02 (Supp. 1964):
Announcement of charge and rights of accused by court. When, after arrest,
the accused is taken before a court or magistrate, or when the accused appears
pursuant to terms of summons or notice, the affidavit or complaint being
first filed, the court or magistrate shall, before proceeding further: (A) In-
form the accused of the nature of the charge against him and the identity of
the complainant and permit the accused or his counsel to see and read the
affidavit or complaint or a copy thereof; (B) Inform the accused of his
right to have counsel and the right to a continuance in the proceedings to
secure counsel; (C) Inform the accused of the effect of pleas of guilty, not
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nouncement." The court then proceeds to an "initial arraignment;"
but if the accused does not have counsel and expresses a desire to
have counsel, the court must (1) grant a continuance, (2) set bail
if the offense is bailable, (3) require the officer or custodian of the
accused to forthwith take a message to the accused's attorney, or
forthwith allow the accused the use of the telephone to do so,"9 6 if
he cannot make bail or the offense is non-bailable.
The Ohio statutes in this field are thus demonstrably liberal in
favor of the accused. Specifically a person arrested without a war-
rant, and very few arrests are made with a warrant, has the follow-
ing minimal rights by statute: (1) the right to call and see his at-
torney upon arrest, (2) the right not to be removed from the place
of initial detention until he sees his attorney, (3) the right to be
brought before a magistrate immediately upon his arrest, (4) the
right to be informed by the magistrate of his constitutional and
statutory rights before any effective step in the judicial process is
taken against him, and (5) the right to have his arrest brought to
the attention of a court through the requirement of a filing of an
affidavit by the police and complaint in the court by the prosecutor.
Until the Domer case in late 1964, these elaborate and carefully
drafted statutes were of little importance or value to the accused.
If they are now to be enforced, a crisis of substantial proportions
guilty, and no contest, of his right to trial by jury, and the necessity of making
written demand therefor; (D) If the charge be a felony, inform the accused
of the nature and extent of possible punishment on conviction and of the
right to preliminary hearing. Such information may be given to each accused
individually or, if at any time there exists any substantial number of defen-
dants to be arraigned at the same session, the judge or magistrate may, by gen-
eral announcement or by distribution of printed matter, advise all those ac-
cused concerning those rights general in their nature, and informing as to
individual matters at arraignment.
196. OHIo REV. CODE § 2937.03 (Supp. 1964):
Arraignment; counsel; bail. After the announcement, as provided by section
2937.02 of the Revised Code the accused shall be arraigned by the magistrate,
or clerk, or prosecutor of the court reading the affidavit or complaint, or read-
ing its substance omitting purely formal parts, to him unless such reading be
waived. The judge or magistrate shall then inquire of the accused whether he
understands the nature of the charge. If he does not indicate understanding, the
magistrate shall give explanation in terms of the statute or ordinance claimed
violated. If he is not represented by counsel and expresses desire to consult
with an attorney at law, the judge or magistrate shall continue the case for a
reasonable time to allow him to send for or consult with counsel and shall
set bail for such later appearance if the offense is bailable. If the accused
is not able to make bail, or the offense is not bailable, the court or magistrate
shall require the officer having custody of accused forthwith to take a message
to any attorney at law within the municipal corporation where accused is
detained, or to make available to accused forthwith use of telephone for
calling to arrange for legal counsel or bail.
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faces the law enforcement agencies and courts.'97 The reason for
the breakdown in the American judicial system of testing probable
cause was the lack of judicial manpower in the arraignment courts.
Consequently, all of the screening and investigation of crime has
been left to the prosecution and police. 9' As the states were re-
quired to provide counsel for the indigent, they may now be com-
pelled to supply judges for the accused.
To this point this review indicates the position taken by the ju-
diciary and the state legislature in adjusting conflicting interests in
this delicate field of regulating the law enforcement agencies han-
dling of a suspect before the judicial process begins.
Invariably then, some consideration must be given to the public
policy involved, the needs of the police as a vital arm of law enforce-
ment, the rationale of the pertinent individual civil liberties, the
present actual police tactics, and the alternative remedies or adjust-
ments to the concedely harsh exclusionary rule.
V. SURVEY AND ANALYSIS OF POLICE PRACTICES AND THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE: SOME OTHER REMEDIES AND
ADJUSTMENTS
A. Contemporary Police Practices in the Arrest, Detention,
and Interrogation of Suspects.99
(1) Delay in Appearance.-The landmark case of Ashcraft v.
Tennessee °9 illustrated the contemporary police practice of de-
taining a suspect in jail until he had confessed or the police were
convinced that the suspect was innocent. In the Domer case the ac-
cused's court appearance was delayed five days;2 ' likewise, the de-
fendant in Cato v. Alvis was held for five days without being brought
into court,2"' patently in violation of the Ohio statutes."' The po-
lice have ignored the preliminary hearing statute because the courts
197. The Ohio preliminary examination is the first judicial stage and includes an
initial arraignment on the complaint. After the grand jury brings an indictment, there
is a second arraignment. Melezke, The New Criminal Preliminary Examination in
Ohio: An Historical Contrast, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 652, 660 (1959); Skeel, Legislative
Changes in Procedural Matters and Appeals, 33 OHIo BAR 625, 630 (1960).
198. Barrett, infra note 199, at 21.
199. Two excellent recent studies of police practices are: Barrett, Police Practices and
the Law - From Arrest to Release or Charge, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 11 (1962); Kamisar,
intra note 249.
200. 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
201. See text accompaying note 170 supra.
202. See note 192 supra.
203. OHIO REV. CODE § 2935.05 (Supp. 1964).
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allowed them to do so without contaminating the confession ob-
tained during the illegal detention.' °" Nor is the penalty provided
for in such statutes ever exacted. 2 5  The police insist that the delay
in bringing the suspect before a court is essential to a conviction in
order to secure that modicum of evidence required to advance the
case from the level of probable cause to proof beyond a reasonable
doubt."0 6 On the other hand, it is insisted that the main objective of
the delay in bringing the prisoner before the court is to obtain
enough evidence from the prisoner on which to satisfy the require-
ment for probable cause to hold him for trial.2 7  These unlawful
arrests are encouraged by the hope that the subsequent interrogation
and detention will produce confessions or incriminating admis-
sions20 8 or leads to direct evidence209 to corroborate the confession
and sustain the burden of proof of corpus delicti.210
Professor Barrett points out the following dangers to individ-
ual liberty by forcing the police to comply with the law and-prompt-
ly arraign all arrested persons: (1) many who would be released
by the police after a short detention will have an official po-
lice record; (2) the judges and courts would be overwhelmed;
(3) innocent persons would unnecessarily have to hire counsel
through the preliminary hearing or initial court appearance stage;
and (4) some guilty persons would escape on release because of po-
lice inability to develop the necessary evidence during the brief de-
tention period.212
(2) Arrest Without Probable Cause.-In Wong Sun, the
agents arrested the defendants without probable cause, i.e., the ar-
resting officers must act on reasonably trustworthy facts which
would induce a reasonably intelligent and prudent man to believe
that the accused had committed a crime.213 The Beck case set forth
the required elements to sustain an arrest: (1) the officer must
testify as to what the informer actually said; and (2) why he be-
204. Allison, He Needs A Lawyer Now, 42 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 113, 117 (1958).
205. Ibid.
206. Inbau, Police Interrogation - A Practical Necessity, 52 J. CRiM. L., C. & P.S. 16,
20 (1961).
207. Weisberg, Police Interrogation of Arrested Persons: A Skeptical View, 52 J.
CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 21, 22 (1961).
208. E.g., State v. Domer, 1 Ohio App. 2d 155, 204 N.E.2d 69 (1964).
209. E.g., Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
210. Note, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 638 (1955).
211. University of California Law School.
212. Barrett, supra note 199, at 46.
213. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949).
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lieved the informer to be credible.214 The federal cases aside, the
law enforcement officials have been upheld on their arrests without
probable cause, as in State v. Collett.215 The law of arrest is widely
disregarded by the police, particularly arrests for investigation and
interrogation of suspicious activities, and frequently in the absence
of probable cause. The reason for this widespread disregard of the
law is the compelling modern pressure on the police for prompt, ef-
fective law enforcement. Modern urban society and its crime con-
ditions no longer even resemble the rural, agricultural society of the
common law which fostered the existing law of arrest.216
In the area of promptness in taking the accused before a
court, and in the rule of probable cause, the police and local courts
have ignored the statutes because of changed social conditions.
(3) Third Degree Methods.-In the Snook21' and Scarberry218
cases in Ohio, the defendants were "slapped" and "cursed" by the
police prior to their confessing or admitting guilt of acts constituting
an admission. The third degree is intended to mean physical coer-
cion, torture and beatings, and it is generally agreed to have ceased
in most places. It is suggested, however, that the third degree
in police work continues except that methods have changed. In-
stead of using extreme or brutal force the police now use more
subtle psychological techniques: strong lights, long periods of in-
terrogation without sleep, and teams of police interrogators to
exhaust the accused, all to the same end - obtaining a confession
from the accused. 219  A public defender insists that the police use
of spotlights, endless grilling and rubber hoses are just as effective
as the original third degree.22°
(4) Psychological Pressure and the Polygraph.-In Leyra v.
Denno,221 the police used a state-employed psychiatrist to induce the
defendant to confess. In Culombe v. Connecticut,22 the police
persuaded the defendant's wife and children to go to the jail and
urge him to confess. In State v. Collett,223 the sheriff forced the
214. See text accompanying note 81 supra.
215. See text accompanying note 142 supra.
216. Ploscowe, A Modern Law of Arrest, 39 MINN. L. REV. 473 (1955).
217. See text accompanying note 135 supra.
218. See text accompanying note 141 supra.
219. Moreland, Some Trends in the Law of Arrest, 39 MINN. L. REV. 479,487 (1955).
220. Allison, supra note 204, at 117.
221. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
222. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
223. See text accompanying note 102 supra.
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defendant to sit in a polygraph chair for nine hours. In Mallory v.
United States, the defendant was given lie-detector tests and interro-
gated in order to obtain the desired inconsistencies and confession.
In Rogers v. Richmond,4 the police chief threatened to arrest
defendant's sick wife if he didn't confess. Physical brutality having
been ruled out as a confession-producing technique, the police have
relied primarily on psychological pressure, and the polygraph is a
prime instrument in breaking down the defendant. Police. inter-
rogators are much more sophisticated than their predecessors. One
official testified that "in my own experience I have learned that
it is much easier to get answers ... in a friendly interview (chat)
at . . . [the suspect's] home ...than the arrestee at the station
house .... [T]he suspect clams up at the station house .... True,
the suspect's answers given at his home prior to arrest are quite
likely false. So much the better! False answers are the wedge
which will ultimately split the block. Involvement in contradiction,
false alibis, etc. will render the ultimate conviction of the suspect
without his further personal participation relatively easy."225  The
same author indicates that additional pressure can be put on a sus-
pect by questioning him in a polygraph chair because of the re-
semblance of the set-up to the electric chair!12' Apparently, the
entire object of the police procedures is to compel self-incrimination.
(5) Statistics of Arrests and Convictions.-Professor Bar-
rett227 in an analysis of statistical data on police practices in Cali-
fornia reports two valuable conclusions: (1) present police interro-
gation of suspects and arrestees is very short in hours, (2) these
interrogations produced a large number of confessions and admis-
sions which ultimately lead to pleas of guilty and non-jury trials.
However, the data is for all crimes, not homicides; hence a caveat. 28
Other investigators report that procedures on arrest and detention
are so non-regulated that statistics on the subject are unreliable.?2
For example, in Milwaukee and Detroit there is no single method
of handling an arrest."0 On the other hand, it is argued that there
224. See text accompanying note 102 supra.
225. Mueller, The Law Relating to Police Interrogation Privileges and Limitations,
52 J. CRm. I., C & P.S. 2, 3 (1961).
226. Id. at 11.
227. University of California law School.
228. Barrett, supra note 199, at 45.
229. LaFave, Detention for Investigation by the Police: An Analysis of Current Pra-
tices, 1962 WASH. U.L.Q. 331.
230. Ibid.
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is no empirical data to prove that the police must have secret in-
terrogation of a suspect and that no other method will solve
crime."  The argument is said to rest entirely on the judgment
of law enforcement officers, and that there is an enormous area of
ignorance as to actual police practices in dealing with criminals
and suspects. 32 One recent annual report indicates that in the
United States approximately 375,000 persons were arrested and
then released; and, approximately fifty per cent of those charged
with crime were subsequently acquitted. These figures are used to
support the argument that the police are dealing with a body of
persons who in the majority are innocent."8
(6) Police Deceit and Trickery to Obtain a Confession.-
Police advisors not only approve of the use of tricks and deception
to obtain a confession, but actively teach the principles of such
techniques to the police." 4 On the other hand, it is argued that
cases like Spano, Rogers, and Escobedo have made such tactics con-
stitutionally impermissible.235 It is argued that the presumption
of innocence requires civilized treatment of the suspect."8 More-
over, "not since the sparrow confessed to the killing of cock robin
S.. has an interrogator had the accused sign an adequate and accu-
rate confession of the occurrence."" 7  Some police techniques are:
(1) play one suspect against the other,23 (2) fake telegrams or
messages from another police department, (3) pretend to have the
accused's fingerprints from the scene of the crime, (4) have an
officer pose as a fellow prisoner, (5) fabricate notes from another
prisoner,"' (6) threaten to arrest one of the suspect's relatives,"'
(7) when the accused needs medical attention, send in a psychiatrist
to interrogate him,24' (8) tell the suspect you will be fired if he
doesn't confess,242 and (9) tell the accused he failed to tell the truth
in the polygraph exam. It may be fairly summarized that the Supreme
Court dislikes these practices. Precisely which methods can con-
231. Weisberg, supra note 207, at 33.
232. Id. at 33, 37.
233. Allison, supra note 204, at 117.
234. Inbau, supra note 206.
235. Weisberg, supra note 207, at 32.
236. Allison, supra note 204, at 114.
237. Ibid.
238. E.g., Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
239. Allison, supra note 204, at 118.
240. E.g., Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
241. Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954).
242. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
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tinue to be used is non-predictable. Probably more important in
terms of the mass of criminal cases, will be the attitude of the multi-
tude of federal district court judges when considering such practices
in habeas corpus proceedings.24
(7) Influence of U.S. Supreme Court Decisions on Local Po-
lice Practices.-First, it is insisted that the Supreme Court has no
authority to regulate police practices;244 this, however, is stoutly
opposed245 and apparently repudiated by the Court.24 Even Pro-
fessor Inbau 7 admits that the local courts must follow the Supreme
Court.2 48 The enforcement of constitutional protection of the
accused's civil liberties has led to reform of police procedures in
numerous jurisdictions.24 It must be concluded that the Court has
substantial influence in the reformation of police practices.
B. Character and Circumstances of Persons Subject to
Arrest, Detention, and Interrogation
Who are the people who actually face the prospect of police
interrogation?
(1) The Poor and Indigent.-In State v. Puckett,25 the de-
fendant could neither hire a lawyer nor raise the $1,000 bail. The
poor, and usually the least educated persons, are most frequently
maltreated by the police, whereas the professional criminals are
treated better because they have counsel and can readily get bail or
habeas corpus.251 With the Court insisting on enforcing the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 2 in state criminal
procedures, Professor Vorenberg253 predicts that the Court will ulti-
243. See, e.g., Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961); see also Fay v. Noia, 372
U.S. 391 (1963).
244. Inbau, supra note 206 passim.
245. The law of admission of confessions into evidence controls. Weisberg, supra
note 207, at 28.
246. See, e.g., text accompanying note 40 supra.
247. See note 97 supra.
248. Ibid.
249. (1) In California following the Caban exclusionary rule, (2) Washington D. C.
following Mallory, and (3) Minnesota following the Mapp case. Kamisar, Public
Safety v. Individual Liberties: Some "Facts" and 'Tbeories," 52 J. CRlM. L., C. & P.S.
171, 179-81 (1962).
250. 201 N.E.2d 86 (Ohio C.P. 1964).
251. Allison, supra note 204, at 116.
252. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12 (1956).
253. Harvard University Law School.
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mately compel the states to provide counsel for indigent suspects.254
Great emphasis is being placed on eliminating discrimination be-
tween citizens because of economic status.2
(2) Young and Inexperienced Offenders.-In Ex parte Sulli-
van,26 two friendless, inexperienced boys who had no prior criminal
record were arrested by the Las Vegas police for murder, taken to
Utah, exhibited to identifying witnesses, and taken into court for
preliminary hearing. At each step they demanded counsel, and
each time they were refused counsel or the appointment or assistance
thereof. While under arrest, they made damaging admissions which
were the sole basis for their conviction and sentence of death. In
the federal habeas corpus action the court held: "By that time
[arraignment] the evidence was all neatly tied up for delivery at
the trial. All of it was obtained from the mouths of immature
defendants, while they are crying out for counsel and being
denied."25
Over twenty percent of the accused are under twenty-one years
of age, and fifty percent are first offenders.258 It is argued that early
counsel for many of these persons is essential to find witnesses who
can establish their innocence, and for the police to be compelled to
collect all actual evidence of the crime before the trail of the crimi-
nal is cold.2" 9 "Some of the judges will admit that the professional
criminals... are well aware of their rights and will say nothing un-
til they see their lawyers .. . The undefended criminals, for the
most part, are perpetrators of amateur crimes .. ."' Professor
Broeder2"' also argues that unlawful detention, especially of the poor
who cannot make bail, is a violation of the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment; and that it is cruel and unusual pun-
ishment, illegally superseding the writ of habeas corpus guaran-
teed by the United States Constitution, article 1, section 9.22
(3) Are Innocent Persons Convicted Because of Contempo-
254. Vorenberg, Police Detention and Interrogation of Uncounselled Suspects: The
Supreme Court and the States, 44 B.U.L. REV. 423, 433 (1964).
255. See, e.g., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT ON THE
CRIMINAL JusTIcE ACT OF 1964, in 85 Sup. Ct. No. 10 (Advance Sheets 1965).
256. 107 F. Supp. 514 (D. Utah 1952).
257. Id. at 517.
258. Allison, supra note 204, at 119.
259. Ibid.
260. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 207 (1955).
261. University of Nebraska Law School.
262. Broeder, Wong Sun v. United States: A Study in Faith & Hope, 42 NEB. L REv.
483, 573-77 (1963).
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rary Police Practices?-Judge Jerome Frank in his recent book 6'
cites examples in Pennsylvania and Missouri where unlawfully ob-
tained confessions were used to send innocent persons to prison. In
State v. Eiseman,264 defendant nineteen-year-old Maurice Toff was
convicted of armed robbery on the basis of a coerced confession, the
product of a forty-hour interrogation session. He was uncondition-
ally pardoned by the governor after the actual criminal was named
and plead guilty - but not before this innocent person had spent
one year in prison. 6 5 In Commonwealth v. Wentzel, "6 the defend-
ant was convicted of murder and sentenced to prison. Defendant
was convicted of killing his pregnant paramour, mainly on his eva-
sions and contradictory statements made to the prosecutor after his
arrest and detention. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court said in af-
firming his conviction: "One of the most significant indications of
defendant's guilt is to be found in the numerous false, evasive and
contradictory statements which he made to the District Attorney
and to the police following his arrest." ' Another man subsequent-
ly confessed to the murder. Based on the investigation and report
of the Court of Last Resort, the defendant was released by the Board
of Pardons after serving three years in prison.268 In Commonwealth
ex rel. Sheeler v. Burke,269 the defendant was released by the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania on a writ of habeas corpus because he
was denied counsel at his arraignment and plea to a capital charge
of murder of a police officer in Philadelphia. Defendant was in the
continuous custody of the police for five to six weeks during which
he signed and agreed to various confessions containing conflicting
statements. He was also held incommunicado in the city hall under
a false name. The confession was obviously involuntary.' On
remand, the trial court directed a verdict of acquittal:
The wrong that was worked against Sheeler cannot be righted
by any perfunctory verdict of acquittal Its sinister implications
are broader and deeper. Considered largely, it poses a grave threat
to the personal safety and libety of us all No man is safe if the
police power is to be abused with impunity, as it was here. When
wisely and lawfully exercised, the police power of the State is a neces-
263. FRANK & FRANK, NoT GUILTY (Popular Library ed. 1962).
264. FRANK & FRANK, op. cit. supra note 263, at 121-22 (unreported case).
265. Ibid.
266. 360 Pa. 137, 61 A.2d 309 (1948).
267. Id. at 145. 61 A.2d at 313.
268. FRANK & FRANK, op. cit. supra note 263, at 87-94.
269. 367 Pa. 152, 79 A.2d 654 (1951).
270. Id. passim.
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sary and beneficent force in promoting the welfare and happiness
of a people, preserving the public peace and protecting the citizen in
the full enjoyment of his dearest possessions, his life and his liberty.
In the hands of arrogant and cruel men, however, this same power
becomes a terrible instrument of governmental tyranny and oppres-
sion, and it is only through the abuse of that power that despotisms
rise and flourish, that liberty vanishes and that the safety and
happiness of a free people are destroyed. Fortunately, Sheeler's fate
[13 years in prison] is a rarity in the administration of justice in
America, but it is an ominous counterpart of what occurs daily be-
hind the Iron Curtain.271
A valuable historical Note identifies numerous other cases where inno-
cent persons were convicted and imprisoned or executed on the basis
of a confession.7 2
On the other hand, Professor Inbau repeatedly cites a case where
without intensive interrogation of a suspect and his confession, the
guilty murderer could not have been punished or convicted.73
C. Rationale and Policy Considerations: Struggle for A Balancing
of Interests
It is a recognized fact that local state judges are hostile to the
intrusion of the U. S. Supreme Court into the local administration
of criminal justice. 4  Yet alternatives other than the exclusionary
rule operating against the confessions and admissions of the accused
unlawfully obtained are seriously lacking in effectiveness.2 5  It is
readily admitted that there are no "answers" to the dilemma be-
tween the competing interests of law enforcement and civil liber-
ties.27
6
(1) Civil Liberties vs. the Police.-The fundamental rights
invaded by police action in the present context are (1) freedom
from physical and mental coercion, (2) freedom from unlawful
detention, (3) freedom from arrest without probable cause, (4) de-
prival of the right to counsel, (5) freedom from incommunicado
detention, '2 77 (6) the privilege against incriminating one's self,278
271. Commonwealth v. Sheeler (Pa. Quarter Session Ct. May 1961 ), quoted in FRANK
& FRANK, op. cit. supra note 263, at 131-32.
272. Note, Proof of Corpus Delicti Aliunde - The Defendant's Confession, 103
U. PA. L. REV. 638-44 (1955).
273. Inbau, infra note 280, at 17 (no case name given).
274. BEANEY, op. cit. supra note 260, at 208.
275. Note, An Historical Argument for the Right to Counsel During Police Interroga-
tion, 73 YALE L.J. 1000, 1052 (1964); see also text accompanying notes 298-313 infra.
276. Vorenberg, supra note 254, at 423-24.
277. FRANK AND FRANK, op. cit. supra note 263, at 131-34.
278. Fink, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination - A Critical Reappraisal, 13
W. RES. L. REV. 722 (1962).
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and (7) denial of the eighth amendment right to bail." 9 A partial
response to these generalized claims has been a denial of the exist-
ence of these rights until the judicial process commences.2"' More-
over, "some trial judges have strong contempt for the theory that
every accused is entitled to an adequate defense. They voice, in one
or more ways, the feeling that too many defendants escape convic-
tion under the present system, and express surprise that anyone
should want to take any action which might ... prevent pleas of
guilty by appointment of counsel before a plea is made."2'' Funda-
mentally, however, there has long been judicial dislike for confes-
sions. Blackstone considered confessions the weakest and most sus-
picious of all testimony, ever liable to be obtained by artifice, false
hopes, promises of favor or menaces.28 2
The rationale of the courts in America is to distrust confessions
in themselves; and virtually every jurisdiction requires independent
proof of the corpus delicti.28 3 Thus, the state courts themselves have
repudiated the idea that confessions are entirely trustworthy. Con-
sequently the problem seems to be more one of friction and lack of
meaningful communication between the federal courts and state of-
ficials than one of adjusting individual liberties to the demands of
modern crime conditions.284
(2) Anglo-American Privilege Against Self-Incrimination.-
Wigmore traces the history of the privilege back to the political and
religious prosecutions for heresy and sedition in the Court of Star
Chamber.285 The modern attitude toward the privilege, however,
is no longer solidly in favor of it.28 On the one hand, it is asserted
(1) the conviction of guilty persons is constantly prevented or ob-
structed by the privilege, (2) the innocent accused does not need the
279. Broeder, supra note 262, at 573.
280. Inbau, Police Interrogation - A Practical Necessity, 52 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 16,
18 (1961).
281. BEANEY, op. cit. supra note 260, at 207.
282. 4 BLAcKSTONE, CoMMENTAIES* 357.
283. Note, supra note 272, at 642.
284. Chief Justice Kingsley Taft of the Ohio Supreme Court suggests compensation
against the state in lieu of the exclusionary rule. His court, however, has not yet breached
the wall of governmental immunity. See Taft, Protecting the Public from Mapp v.
Ohio Without Amending the Constitution, 50 A.B.A.J. 815 (1964), in 38 OHIO
BAR 25, 29 (1965); see also Recent Decision, 15 W. RFS. L. REv. 412 (1964).
285. WGMORE, EVIDENCE 370 (Student's Text ed. 1935). After 1600, the wide-
spread resentment to these inquisitions established the common law principle that no
one is bound to betray himself. Id. at 371.
286. Justice Jackson was in favor of allowing coerced confessions by lengthy police
interrogations as a counterweight to the privilege. See text accompanying note 41
supra.
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privilege, and (3) the guilty accused ought not have it. On the
other hand, it is asserted (1) the innocent need it to avoid having
discreditable facts brought out against them at trial, (2) they need
it most of all in the preliminary inquiries of the grand jury and
prosecutor for such inquiries start on suspicion only to proceed to
malicious ends, and (3) abolition of the privilege would tempt
prosecutors and police to be slack in procuring ample evidence.8 7
The value of the fifth amendment privilege in the ordinary arrest
and detention today is useless, however, if the accused doesn't know
of the privilege and his right to remain silent in the face of continu-
ous police pressure to make damaging incriminations; thus, the
demand that the accused have the right to assistance of counsel im-
mediately on arrest.2 88 If this argument is fully embraced, counsel
must be provided on arrest for the indigent. Law enforcement
vigorously opposes any extension of counsel into the police station,
for they know the attorney will (1) tell the accused to be silent,
(2) obtain bail, (3) force the police to bring the accused before a
court, (4) invalidate arrests of suspects where there is no genuine
probable cause, and (5) prevent the police from consolidating their
case against the accused by securing evidence from him.28 9 Consti-
tutionally, it is asserted that the right to counsel on arrest is based
on the privilege against self incrimination and the police should not
be allowed to use tactics which produce self-incrimination. 9 '
Professor Silving29' in her analysis of psychological aspects of
the rules of law on confessions, oaths, and self-incriminations, dem-
onstrates that the objective of the Supreme Court in excluding il-
legally obtained confessions is not based on any expressed rule of
law but on an expression of "our culture's innermost unconscious
aversion against all confessions. '292  The period between arrest and
being taken to court is said to be the most important phase of crimi-
nal procedure, for here, much more so than during trial, the case is
287. WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 285, at 388-89. "Sir James Stephan ... observed
that the native [Indian] officials sometimes applied torture to an accused... 'There is a
great deal of laziness in it. It is far pleasanter to sit comfortably in the shade, rubbing
red pepper into a poor devil's eyes than to go about in the sun hunting up evidence.'"
Id. at 389.
288. Allison, He Needs a Lawyer Now, 42 J. AM. JUD. SOC'Y 113, 114 (1958).
289. Mueller, The Law Relating to Police Interrogation Privileges and Limitations,
52 J. CRiM. L., C. & P.S. 2, 13 (1961).
290. Weisberg, Police Interrogation of Arrested Persons: A Skeptical View, 52 J.
CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 21 (1961).
291. University of Puerto Rico Law School.
292. SILVING, ESSAYS ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 265 (1964).
[VOL 16:725
Right to Counsel on Arrest
to be won - or lost.2.3 In the confession and right to counsel cases
this was patently true for the trial of the accused was based on his
confession, admissions, or falsehoods. If American jurisprudence is
devoted to the policy of the privilege against self-incrimination, then,
all of the ancillary rights must be granted to the accused at this stage
in the proceedings.
(3) "Admissions" Used to Attack the Credibility or Reputa-
tion of the Defendant Before the Jury.-A secondary aspect to the
entire problem for the defense is that of the prosecution indirectly
convicting the accused. In a typical case of this sort, e.g., State v.
Snook,"4 the prosecutor presented as direct evidence of the crime
the defendant's admissions made in the police station to newsmen
within the hearing of the police. Note that he did not confess; but
he did admit enough to seriously implicate himself. Now while the
so-called burden of proof in a criminal case never shifts to a defend-
ant the jury is going to convict the defendant unless he takes the
stand and (1) denies guilt, (2) explains away the implications, and
(3) maintains his "reputation" to the jury for truthfulness and ve-
racity. Moreover, once he takes the stand, the prosecutor can intro-
duce prior criminal history and reputation in the community for
truth and veracity.295  As seen in the Domer26 and Sheeler 9 cases,
these "secondary" considerations are of the highest importance in
criminal trials. While these considerations may be dismissed as trial
tactics; they constitute important elements in the process of the law.
Furthermore, it cannot be said that the limits on the privilege against
self-incrimination and the exclusionary rule do not each play a.high-
ly significant part in the outcome of each case. .
D. Some Alternative Remedies to Secure the Civil Liberties of the
Accused in Lieu of the Exclusionary Rule
(1) Tort Remedies.-Is the threat of a civil action for dal-
ages by a private citizen against an officer sufficient to curb "law-
less" police? California Attorney General Coakley indicates that it
is, and that false arrest suits have put considerable pressure on the
police to obey the rules of probable cause on arrest without a war-
293. Mueller, supra note 289, at 2.
294. See text accompanying note 134 supra.
295. See generally Note, Evidence of Criminal History in Ohio Criminal Prosecutions,
15 W. Rns. L REV. 772 (1964).
296. See text accompanying note 173 supra.
297. See text accompanying notes 267 and 225 supra.
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rant.298 On the other hand, Professor Foote299 indicates that the
cases so far have proven the uselessness of private tort actions against
the police."00  As illustrative, in the case of Mason v. Wrightson' 1
the plaintiff was unlawfully frisked and he sued for false arrest and
imprisonment. His recovery: one cent! In addition to an unsympa-
thetic judge and jury, the following problems beset the civil plain-
tiff: (1) the government is normally immune from suit,.. 2 (2) the
ordinary policeman has no assets to satisfy a judgment, (3) bond-
ing companies cannot be held liable because illegal acts are declared
outside the officer's duties, (4) few persons suffering illegal arrest
or detention have sufficient community standing to obtain a mean-
ingful recovery, (5) the accused must come into court with clean
hands,0 3 and (6) the plaintiff must have substantial money to hire
his own attorney because the government can use all of the legal
tactics available to "wear the plaintiff down" with government-paid
attorneys to defend the police. Aside from the occasional "crusader"
who goes out for the sake of repairing his pride, the private tort ac-
tion is a rusty sword. Consider the unfortunate case of Bender v.
Addams. °4 A judge issued a search warrant to prohibition officers
who searched the plaintiff's house but found no liquor. In an action
for trespass it was held that there might be a recovery, but a jury
verdict was reversed for error and remanded for a new trial. There
was no recovery. °0
Some suggested changes in a private system of tort recovery are
(1) make the government liable for the officer's tort, (2) provide
minimum liquidating damages, and (3) prevent the police-defend-
ant from introducing evidence of the plaintiff's bad character, crimi-
298. Coakley, Law and Police Practice: Restrictions in the Law of Arrest, 52 Nw.
U.L. REv. 2, 5 (1957).
299. University of Nebraska Law School.
300. Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L.
REV. 493 (1955).
301. 205 Md. 481, 109 A.2d 128 (1954).
302. E.g., CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 820.4: "A public employee is not liable for his act
or omission, exercising due care, in the execution or enforcement of any law. Nothing
in this section exonerates a public employee from liability for false arrest or false im-
prisonment."
303. Foote, supra note 300, at 499-500, 504. Sometimes a civil action to redress a
public wrong proves unwise. During the course of the slander action of Alger Hiss
against Whittaker Chambers, the notorious "pumpkin papers" were produced in a dis-
covery-deposition proceeding. This led to Hiss' ultimate criminal conviction for per-
jury. See Hiss, IN THE COURT OF PUBLIC OPINION 157-60, 323 (1957).
304. 28 Ohio App. 75, 162 N.E. 604 (1928).
305. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 178 (1959).
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nal record, or low economic status; otherwise plaintiff will rarely
succeed."°'
(2) Civil Rights Act Prosecutions.-Under these federal stat-
utes'" a state officer may be prosecuted for violating the federal
constitutional rights of a citizen. This statute has been used in
prosecutions of police officers who have conducted unlawful
searches, seizures, and beatings.3 8 In order to make this function
more effective it has been suggested that a special federal office be
created to prosecute these cases with a penalty on the offending offi-
cer of thirty days in jail. However, the City of Chicago noted a sub-
stantial increase in federal prosecutions under existing civil rights-
enforcement machinery.0 9
(3) Police Inform Defendant of His Rights.-Traditionally
the American police have refused to inform a suspect of his consti-
tutional rights, contrary to the English rules and F.B.I. practice."'
Apparently, however, the English police and judges do not follow
the rule that the suspect must be warned when the officer decides
to charge the suspect with a crime."' The Supreme Court in Esco-
306. Foote, supra note 300, at 514; see also Taft, supra note 284.
307. 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 and REv. STAT. §§ 1977-83, 1985, 1987-88, 1990, 722,
5517 (1875), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-95 (1958).
308. See, e.g., Screws v. United States, 325, U.S. 91 (1945); Pool v. United States,
260 F. 2d 57 (9th Cir. 1958); Koehler v. United States, 189 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1951);
United States v. Cooney, 217 F. Supp. 417 (D. Colo. 1963). The federal district
courts in habeas corpus actions have the authority to review state convictions for viola-
tions of constitutional due process rights. This "remedy" to correct errors may be
much more effective than a cause of action initiated by a federal prosecutor. In Fay
v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), the Supreme Court held that the federal courts had
jurisdiction to consider each allegation by a state prisoner as to violation of his federal
constitutional rights in state trials, and the state courts need not have first decided each
such issue. Moreover, in federal habeas corpus proceedings, the issues of a fair trial are
to be tested by federal constitutional standards under the fourteenth amendment. Shep-
pard v. Maxwell, 231 F. Supp. 37, 43 (S.D. Ohio 1964), rev'd, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 2588-
89 (6th Cir. May 18, 1965). Two of the stipulated issues in the Sheppard case in-
volved pretrial assistance of counsel. Id. at 41. However, the court decided the case
on other grounds and the prisoner was ordered released. Id. at 71.
309. Kamisar, supra note 249, at 182-83; see generally Stephens, The Fourteenth
Amendment and Confessions of Guilt: Role of the Supreme Court, 15 MERCER L. REV.
309 (1964). The Chicago Law Director reported that "the increase in the number
of suits filed ... [against police officers] occasioned decisions broadening federal jur-
isdiction and legislation permitting suit on any allegation of liability on the part of
police officers arising from arrest or prosecution made necessary the creation of a sub-
division to handle this increased work load." For 1963, 39 cases were filed in the fed-
eral district court against police officers for violation of civil rights; 95 false arrest cases
were filed in state courts. Cases won: 40; lost: 7; settled: 29. CORPORATION COUN-
SEL, 1963 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DEP'T OF LAW, CITY OF CHICAGO 59-60.
310. Kerr, Investigation of the Homicide Scene, in CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION AND
INTERROGATION 158, 178 (Gerber & Schroeder ed. 1962); Wiesberg, supra note 290,
at 39.
311. Id. at 40.
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bedo noted though that the judges had been "tightening up" on the
rules.31 This alternative offers a real possibility of working if the
police cooperate, for the ruling in Escobedo specifically requires the
police to effectively warn the accused of his absolute constitutional
right to remain silent.313 An effective reform in police procedures
on this single point could alleviate the federal-state friction on this
issue.
(4) No-Bail Programs.-Within the last few years no-bail
projects have been initiated in New York, Cleveland and Toledo.314
These programs will prove to be of substantial assistance to the in-
nocent person in obtaining counsel and proof of his innocence. It
will also tend to give the police fewer opportunities for secret in-
terrogations and unlawful periods of detention.
(5) Remedies More Harsh to Law Enforcement Than the Ex-
clusionary Rule.-It has, first of all, been suggested that an accused
who has had his constitutional rights violated by the police should
be immune from further prosecution.313 Secondly, it has been sug-
gested that the McNabb-Mallory rule be applied to the states. This
proposal arouses considerable controversy.
In 1957 after Mallory, the United States Attorney testified
before Congress calling for emergency legislation to allow a delay
in appearance. By 1960, however, he indicated the adjustment
had been made by the Washington D. C. police and legislation was
not required. 16 The Washington and Los Angeles police chiefs
had predicted a complete breakdown in law enforcement. This did
not occur. Another suggestion is that the accused be promptly ar-
raigned after a permitted interrogation in which a stenographic rec-
ord is taken. 1' This reform, however, permits delay in arraignment
for the purpose of seeking a confession and does not guarantee the
right to counsel and to remain silent. Moreover, how can police
interrogations be restricted to a stenographically-equipped chamber?
Once the assumption is made that the police are to be allowed a
"reasonable time" for interrogations, or a fixed number of hours,
312. 378 U.S. 478, 487 n.6 (1964).
313. See text accompanying note 122 supra. It must be noted, however, that the rule
is phrased in the conjunctive, i.e., there is no duty on the police to warn every suspect
but only those whose situation fits the entire rule. See text accompanying note 128
supra. But see note 128 supra.
314. See authorities cited at note 159 supra.
315. Broeder, supra note 262, at 516 & n.121.
316. Weisberg, supra note 290, at 27, 34.
317. Enker & Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and Escobedo
v. Illinois, 49 MINN. L. REv. 47, 85 (1964).
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e.g., twelve hours suggested in the post-Mallory Congressional- hear-
ings, there is no effective limit on the length and scope of interroga-
tion, and the courts will ultimately defer to the -judgment of the
police, for any permitted period of allowable police interrogation
admits the right of the police to obtain a confession from the ar-
restee. 18 The McNabb-Mallory rule is still much tougher on the
police than Escobedo, for under Mallory the federal police cannot
delay for interrogation; in Escobedo delay is permissible under many
lenient conditions. One of the difficulties in attempting to make the
states apply the prompt appearance rule of Mallory is that it would
be of minimal assistance to the accused. The rule works to the ad-
vantage of the federal arrestee primarily because he is taken before
a U. S. commissioner who operates under well-defined federal rules
which specify his duties to protect the accused's rights. No such ma-
chinery exists in many states. A prompt arraignment would be a
short trip nowhere. The right to see a lawyer, however, or a clear
warning by the police, would be of greater value to the accused in
many state procedures.
The Supreme Court could have attacked the confession dilemma
either through the prompt appearance rule or the right to counsel
rule. It has chosen to follow the right to counsel tack. In a city
like Cleveland there are about 4000 attorneys and twenty-five to
thirty arraignment judges in municipal courts. The arrestee stands
a better numerical chance of getting assistance from an attorney than
a judge. Moreover, the magistrate is in court only during regular
hours, and it is known that the police make most of their arrests at
night or on weekends. Considering the trend of case law, the Mc-
Nabb-Mallory rule seems neither necessary nor desirable as a na-
tional rule to be applied to the enormous mass of criminal cases. As
a reason for adoption of McNabb-Mallory to the states, Professor
Broeder provides the following description:
Jail is always uncomfortable and one, whether innocent or not, is
typically dealt with by the police as a hardened criminal. Once
arrested, he is searched, "mugged" and fingerprinted and mostjailers automatically assume guilt, and that serious. Punishment
in their minds is required and likewise the necessity for blind,
instant obedience to their commands. The food in local jails is
rotten - one is permitted no other - and coffee and soft drinks
are hardly available on demand. Lavatory conditions are disgust-
ing and prisoners are typically deprived of the right even to smoke
and to make purchases to accommodate their special needs. One
may lose his job if not immediately released, and he is in any event
318. Weisberg, supra note 290, at 38-39.
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without family or friends to comfort him. Often they will not
even be notified of his arrest. Small wonder then that serious
psychological damage occurs to some persons after only a few
hours behind bars.319
Another commentator predicts eventual application of Mallory to
the states because the majority already have prompt arraignment
statutes.3
°
E. Alternative Remedies to Secure Effective Law Enforcement
Law enforcement people have not proposed many reforms. The
city police departments suffer from rising crime loads, rising costs,
and too little money and public support. Their only alternative un-
der present case law is to (1) improve the calibre of officers, and
(2) step up training in scientific and technical crime detection. The
example of the F.B.I. usually emerges for a model. Complete
emulation is desirable though practically impossible, for the F.B.I.
agent is usually a lawyer, and to fill the police departments with
such men would take most of the legal profession.
About twenty years ago the Interstate Commission on Crime
promulgated a Uniform Arrest Act. One object was to permit the
police more flexibility in arresting and detaining suspects. Only
Delaware, New Hampshire and Rhode Island have adopted any
part of the act."' The other valuable feature for aiding law en-
forcement in the act is that it permits an arrest without probable
cause.32 Whether such a provision could today survive constitu-
tional assault is highly doubtful.32 3
VI. CONCLUSION
Under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the
Supreme Court has revolutionized allowable state criminal proce-
dures in the arrest and detention of persons suspected or accused of
crimeY.4  The Bill of Rights in the United States Constitution now
stands as a bulwark of individual liberty against the states as well as
319. Broeder, supra note 262, at 567.
320. Casenote, Evidence - Federal Imposition of the McNabb Rule Upon State
Courts, 24 GEORGIA B.J. 120 (1961); Rothblatt & Rothblatt, Police Interrogation:
The Right to Counsel and to Prompt Arraignment, 27 BROOKLYN L. REv. 24, 34-39
(1960).
321. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1902-03 (1953); N.H. REV. STAT. ch. 594, §§ 2-3
(1955); R.I. GEN. LAws tit. 12, ch. 7, § 1-2 (1956).
322. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REV. 315, 322 (1942).
323. Cf. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
324. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 468 (1964).
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the federal government.3 2' The sixth amendment right to counsel,.26
the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable seizures of
persons and arrests without probable cause, -2 7 and the fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination now regulate state police
practices.3 21 "Lawless police" are to be disciplined by depriving
them of their victim's conviction by excluding the confession, ad-
mission, or incriminating evidence unlawfully obtained.
29
State statutes on the right to call and see counsel at arrest have
been revived.3 ' The rule that a confession would be allowed into
evidence if truthful and reliable has been struck down where the
confession or self-incrimination was obtained by unlawful means.331
The Supreme Court has decided that only the exclusionary rule can
effectively discipline the police in providing for the civil liberties of
persons arrested or accused of crime.332  The Court seeks to fully
effect the privilege against self-incrimination. 3 Only by effective-
ly warning a suspect or accused of his constitutional rights before
he incriminates himself may law enforcement prevent further Court
supervision of police procedures.334
Professor Harry Jones33 has said that justice must seem to be
done, as well as actually be done in substance.33 That such is a
fundamental principle of procedural due process of law cannot be
denied. Law enforcement must give the appearance of fair treat-
ment to the accused and recognition to the presumption of inno-
cence. A reasonable prognosis is that the courts will continue to
enlarge the rights of suspects in overturning convictions based on
confessions, detentions, and arrests made under circumstances of
disputed legality.3 7
RUSSELL B. MAMONE
325. See authorities cited note 26 supra.
326. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
327. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471
(1963).
328. bMalloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
329. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
330. State v. Domer, I Ohio App. 2d 155, 204 N.E.2d 69 (1964).
331. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
332. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
333. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 468 (1964).
334. See text accompanying note 313 supra.
335. Columbia University Law School.
336. Lectures at Western Reserve University Law School, December 2-4, 1963 (Au-
thor's notes).
337. See authorities cited note 128 supra.
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